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Preface 
During  the  1970s  and  1980s  Japanese  corporations  were  considered 
models  for  business  enterprises  in  other  nations.  But  today,  as  the 
Japanese  economy  languishes  in  recession,  many  corporate  executives, 
economists,  and  policymakers  are  looking  to  the  American  corporate 
model  as  the  one  that  will  bring  success.  In  this  brief,  William  Lazonick, 
of  INSEAD  and  the  Center  for  Industrial  Competitiveness  at  the 
University  of  Massachusetts  Lowell,  challenges  this  view,  arguing  that 
American  corporations,  having  followed  a  strategy  of  downsizing,  may 
appear  strong,  but  their  policy  of  extracting  short-term  financial  returns 
for  the  benefit  of  stockholders  and  executives  will  be  detrimental  in  the 
long  run. 
In  Lazonick’s  view,  the  Japanese  focus  on  allocating  resources  in  ways 
that  strengthen  the  corporation  and  boost  the  productivity  of  labor  pro- 
vides  benefits  to  the  society  at  large  and  makes  possible  a  commitment 
to  lifetime  employment  for  the  labor  force.  This  focus  makes  corporate 
enterprises  fundamentally  stronger  than  American  corporations  and  in  a 
better  position  to  generate  sustainable  prosperity-the  spreading  of  the 
benefits  of  economic  growth  to  more  and  more  people  over  a  prolonged 
period  of  time.  Japanese  corporate  managers  have  been  protected  from 
shareholder  pressure  to  extract  immediate  financial  gains  and  have  been 
allowed  to  retain  control  over  the  allocation  of  resources  and  returns  of 
their  companies  by  the  institution  of  cross+hareholding  and  by  the  exis- 
tence  from  the  1950s  to  the  1980s  of  a  highly  integrated  banking  system 
structured  to  provide  financial  support  for  industrial  development. 
How  long  this  system  of  corporate  governance  will  remain  in  tact,  how- 
ever,  is  now  open  to  question.  According  to  Lazonick,  the  financial 
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crisis  and  the  prolonged  recession  of  the  1990s  were  due  not  to  weak- 
ness  in  the  productive  capacity  of  the  Japanese  economy,  but  to  a  trans- 
formation  of  the  role  of  the  financial  sector  and  to  its  participation  in 
speculative  activities  (which  arose  as  a  result  of  the  success  of  the  indus- 
trial  development).  The  government  is  now  in  the  process  of  altering 
the  financial  sector  in  order  to  create  new  business  opportunities  and 
new  sources  of  profits  for  banks,  securities  companies,  and  insurers.  As 
yet,  financial  reorganization  does  not  entail  dismantling  the  cross- 
shareholding  system  or  deregulating  domestic  interest  rates  and  the  gov- 
ernment  appears  commitned  to  financial  reforms  that  do  not  threaten 
the  retain-and-allocate  strategy  of  the  existing  corporate  governance 
system.  However,  some  changes  in  Japanese  corporate  governance  are 
inevitable  in  response  to  the  realities  of  competitive  challenges  and 
financial  pressures. 
Economists  and  policymakers  generally  agree  that  it  is  important  for  the 
world  economy  that  Japan  pull  its  economy  out  of  recession.  Lazonick’s 
work  suggests  that  the  Japanese  industrial  economy  remains  strong  and 
points  to  the  possibility  that  the  Japanese  corporate  model  may  still  be 
the  best  one  for  corporations  in  other  nations,  including  the  United 
States,  to  follow.  I  welcome  your  comments  on  this  research. 
Dimitri  B.  Papadimitriou,  Prestirtt 
December  1998 . 
Japanese  Corporate 
Governance  and  Strategy 
Japan’s  financial  morass  and  recessionary  conditions  in  the  1990s  stand  in 
contrast  to  its  high  growth  from  the  mid  1950s  to  the  early  1970s  and  its 
booming  prosperity  from  the  late  1970s  through  the  1980s.  The  growth 
rate  of  the  Japanese  economy  has  sputtered  throughout  the  1990s  and 
was  even  negative  in  1997  (Yokoyama  1997).  During  the  first  quarter  of 
1998  Japan’s  gross  domestic  product  declined  at  an  annual  rate  of  5.3  per- 
cent  (Abrahams  and  Tett  1998).  J  p  a  an’s  unemployment  rate  of  just  over 
4  percent  in  April  1998  is  enviable  by  world  standards,  but  the  unem- 
ployment  rates  since  1996  are  higher  than  they  have  been  in  Japan  since 
the  current  mode  of  calculating  the  rates  began  in  1953  (Nikkei  Weekly 
1998).  As  many,  if  not  most,  economists  see  it,  Japan  has  now  entered 
the  real  world  of  international  economic,  and  unless  it  quickly  deregu 
lates  its  capital  and  labor  markets,  it  will  not  be  able  to  get  its  economy 
back  on  track. 
Meanwhile,  in  the  United  States,  stock  markets  have  been  booming 
throughout  the  199Os,  and  the  economy  has  been  growing  rapidly  since 
the  mid  1990s.  The  U.S.  unemployment  rate  of  4,3  percent  in  May  1998 
was  the  lowest  for  the  nation  since  early  1970  (U.S.  Bureau  of  the 
Census  1976,  135;  1997,  397).  The  financial  turmoil  that  the  United 
Stares  experienced  in  the  198Os,  with  the  savings  and  loans  crisis  and 
major  bank  failures,  now  seems  to  be  a  thing  of  the  past.  Many 
Americans  are  also  now  hopeful  that  the  increase  in  income  inequality 
that  began  in  the  mid  1970s  and  the  corporate  downsizing  that  began  in 
the  early  1980s  have  also  been  relegated  to  history.  In  the  late  1990s  the 
perception  of  the  U.S.  economy,  both  at  home  and  abroad,  is  that  it  is 
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more  and  more  Americans  over  a  prolonged  period  of  time. 
In  this  paper  I  examine  the  perceived  weakness  of  the  Japanese  economy 
in  the  1990s  from  a  comparative  and  historical  perspective  (Lazonick 
and  O’Sullivan  1997a).  The  basic  question  is  how  do  the  resource- 
allocation  strategies  of  corporations  influence  the  sustainable  perfor- 
mance  of  national  economies  (Lazonick  and  O’Sullivan  forthcoming). 
The  main  propositions  that  frame  this  perspective  as  applied  to  the 
United  States  and  Japan  are: 
l  The  economic  development  of  advanced  economies  depends  criti- 
cally  on  the  investment  strategies  of  corporate  enterprises  to  develop 
and  utilize  productive  resources. 
l  Both  U.S.  and  Japanese  corporate  enterprises  are  making,  and  will 
continue  to  make,  investments  in  productive  capabilities  that  can 
result  in  higher-quality,  lower-cost  products. 
l  The  resource-allocation  strategies  of  U.S.  corporate  enterprises  favor 
rhe  downsizing  of  corporate  labor  forces  and  the  distribution  of  cor- 
porate  revenues  to  financial  interests. 
l  In  contrast  to  the  “downsize-and-distribute”  strategy  of  U.S.  corpora- 
tions,  Japanese  corporate  enterprises  pursue  a  “retain-and-reallocate” 
strategy,  retaining  corporate  revenues  and  reallocating  the  labor 
force. 
l  The  choice  of  the  downsize-and-distribute  strategy  or  the  retain-and- 
reallocate  strategy  reflects  fundamental  institutional  differences 
between  the  two  nations  in  the  ways  in  which,  at  the  macroeco- 
nomic  level,  money  is  saved  and  invested  and,  at  the  microeconomic 
level,  corporate  enterprises  are  governed.’ 
In  the  advanced  economies,  major  industrial  corporations,  by  virtue  of 
their  prior  success  in  developing  and  utilizing  productive  resources,  con- 
trol  at  any  point  in  time  vast  amounts  of  productive  resources  and  finan- 
cial  returns  that  remain  to  be  allocated  to  alternative  uses.  Corporate 
strategy  is  about  the  forms  that  these  allocation  decisions  take,  corporate 
governance  is  about  the  institutions  that  shape  the  allocation  decisions 
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which  people  are  employed  and  the  ways  in  which  investments  are 
financed.  The  institutions  have  deep  historical  roots  in  particular  social, 
generally  national,  environments  (Lazonick  and  G’SuHivan  1997b),  but 
they  also  evolve  in  response  to  pressures  on  corporations  to  change  the 
way  they  allocate  their  resources  and  returns.  The  institutions  of 
employment  and  finance  that  prevail  in  the  United  States  place  much 
more  pressure  on  corporations  to  downsize  and  distribute  than  the  corre- 
sponding  institutions  in  Japan.  Even  so,  the  downsize-and-distribute 
strategy  did  not  become  a  widespread  phenomenon  in  the  United  States 
until  the  1980s  and  I99Os,  when  it  replaced  the  corporate  retain-and- 
reallocate  strategy  that  had  been  dominant  in  previous  decades. 
The  main  sources  of  these  pressures  in  the  United  States  since  the  1970s 
have  been  (1)  corporate  overextension,  which  made  it  difftcult  for  cor- 
porate  strategists  to  understand  the  investment  requirements  for  the 
development  and  utilization  of  productive  resources  in  different  lines  of 
business,  (2)  international  competition,  which  transformed  the  organiza- 
tional  requirements  of  technological  development  in  different  industries, 
and  (3)  intergenerational  dependence,  which  shifted  the  balance  of 
power  within  the  United  States  from  those  whose  interests  lay  in 
employment  incomes  to  those  whose  interests  lay  in  retirement  incomes 
(Lazonick  and  O’Sullivan  forthcoming).  In  the  1990s  the  pressures  from 
these  three  sources  have  been  building  in  other  advanced  economies  as 
well.  Currently,  for  example,  as  G’Sullivan  (1998)  argues,  corporate  gov- 
ernance  in  Germany  is  at  a  crossroads  in  responding  to  these  pressures. 
Japan  is  not  immune  to  these  pressures.  Like  all  the  advanced 
economies,  Japan  faces  the  long-run  problem  of  a  growing  financial  bure 
den  in  providing  pension  and  health  benefits  to  an  aging  population.  But 
thus  far,  in  contrast  to  the  United  States  and  western  European  coun- 
tries,  Japan  has  been  pursuing  a  strategy  of  keeping  people  employed 
until  later  in  their  lives  as  a  way  of  decreasing  intergenerational  depen- 
dence.  Japan  is  also  facing  new  competitive  challenges,  particularly  from 
other  East  Asian  economies,  such  as  South  Korea,  Taiwan,  and  China, 
but  it  remains  a  power  in  international  industrial  competition;  despite 
high  wages  and  a  relatively  strong  currency  throughout  most  of  the 
199Os,  it  has  continued  to  create  competitive  pressures  on  the  rest  of  the 
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world.  The  leading  Japanese  corporations  have  gown  larger  and  become 
more  bureaucratic  than  in  the  past,  but  as  a  central  feature  of  their 
retain-and-reallocate  strategies,  they  have  avoided  some  problems  of  cor- 
porate  overextension  by  spinning  off  personnel  and  money  into  new 
business  enterprises  that  are  autonomous  units  of  strategic  control. 
Japanese  corporations  continue  to  pursue  a  strategy  of  retain  and  reallo- 
cate  on  the  basis  of  the  strong  persistence  of  the  institutions  of  lifetime 
employment  and  cross-shareholding,  which  shaped  Japanese  corporate 
governance  in  the  past.  Nevertheless,  in  response  to  the  realities  of  pro- 
duction  and  financial  pressures  of  the  199Os,  important  changes  are  tak- 
ing  place  in  the  ways  people  are  employed  and  remunerated  in  Japanese 
corporations.  Working  within  the  institutional  framework  of  lifetime 
employment  and  cross-shareholding,  the  challenge  now  facing  Japanese 
industrial  corporations  is  how  to  retain  people  as  productive  employees 
for  more  years  of  their  lives  and  how  to  reallocate  these  labor  resources 
to  make  them  more  productive. 
The  Japanese  System  of  Corporate  Governance 
Lifetime  employment  and  cross-shareholding  form  the  institutional 
foundations  for  the  operation  of  the  Japanese  system  of  corporate  gover- 
nance,  with  cross+hareholding  making  lifetime  employment  possible 
(although  not  necessarily  viable).  Lifetime  employment  means  that  the 
company  takes  responsibility  for  a  certain  class  of  employees  from  the 
time  they  are  hired  to  the  time  they  retire.  By  ensuring  that  the  returns 
of  the  enterprise  can  be  devoted  to  reinvestment  in  the  productive  capa- 
bilities  of  these  employees  and  the  capital  equipment  that  they  can  use, 
cross-shareholding  provides  a  foundation  of  financial  commitment  for 
the  pursuit  of  the  enterprise’s  employment  objectives. 
From  the  perspective  of  the  Anglo-American  principal-agent  model  of 
the  firm,  which  posits  that  corporations  should  be  governed  in  the  inter- 
est.  of  stockholders  without  regard  to  the  interests  of  employees,  the  ins& 
tutions  of  cross-shareholding  and  lifetime  employment  make  the  Japanese 
system  appear  to  be  what  one  scholar  has  termed  “anti-governance” 
(Scher  1995).  Such  a  persptictive  ignores  the  implications  of  the 
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commitment  to  deliver  lifetime  employment  as  the  fundamental  objec- 
tive  of  the  Japanese  enterprise?  This  commitment  accentuates  the  need 
for  active  corporate  governance  in  the  allocation  of  resources  and  returns. 
The  corporation  must  develop  and  utilize  its  productive  resources,  includ- 
ing  its  human  resources,  in  ways  that  enable  it  to  generate  the  sustained 
returns  that  can  keep  its  labor  force  employed  at  acceptable  standards  of 
living.  Within  the  rigidity  imposed  by  the  commitment  to  lifetime 
employment,  considerable  flexibility  in  corporate  governance  in  the  allo- 
cation  of  resources  and  returns  is  required  (Dare  19%). 
Financial  Foundation  of  Corporate  Governance 
The  Japanese  system  of  corporate  governance  is  intensely  hierarchical, 
with  ultimate  strategic  decision  making  the  prerogative  of  an  executive 
board  of  top  managers,  of  whom  the  president  is  the  most  powerful  fig- 
ure.  Many  of  these  top  managers  also  sit  on  the  company’s  board  of 
directors.  Among  the  largest  Japanese  companies,  about  one-tenth  of  the 
directors  are  employed  by  other  corporations  that  are  major  shareholders 
of  the  company  and  with  which  the  company  has  extensive  business 
relations.  Another  one-fifth  of  the  directors  are  full-time  managers  with 
rhe  company  who  have  pursued  most  of  their  careers  with  other  compa- 
nies  or  government  agencies  but  have  been  permanently  transferred 
(Gerlach  1992,  132-137,  299).’  Typically,  banks,  business  enterprises, 
and  government  agencies  have  each  supplied  about  one-third  of  these 
part-time  and  full-time  “dispatched  directors,”  with  hanks  generally  hav- 
ing  no  more  than  one  such  director  with  any  one  industrial  or  commer- 
cial  enterprise  at  a  time.  The  rest  of  the  directors,  including  the 
company  auditors,  are  lifetime  company  employees  or  former  employees. 
Board  of  directors  meetings  are  in  effect  executive  management  meet- 
ings,  and  any  independent  supervisory  function  that  the  hoard  of  direc- 
tors  as  such  might  serve  is  merely  ceremonial.  Even  more  ceremonial  are 
stockholders’  meetings,  which  are  held  once  a  year.  This  is  so  despite  the 
fact  that,  legally,  the  top  managers  and  board  of  directors  of  a  company 
are  responsible  to  stockholders,  who,  according  to  the  Japanese 
Commercial  Code,  have  the  right  to  elect  directors,  approve  the  annual 
balance  sheet,  decide  dividends,  and  approve  top  management  decisions 
such  as  gifts  of  stocks  to  companies  for  business  purposes. 
The  .kmme  Levy  Economics  hiruce  oj  Bard  Cokgz  11 Jqamse  Corporare  G-  e  and Straregy 
The  essence  of  cross-shareholding,  which  accounts  for  about  two  of 
every  three  shares,  is  the  willingness  of  participant  companies  to  be  “sta- 
ble  shareholders.”  Except  under  conditions  of  financial  duress,  a 
Japanese  company  does  not  sell  the  stock  of  another  company  it  holds  as 
a  stable  investor;  when  it  must  sell  the  stock,  the  buyer  is  another  stable 
shareholder,  and  the  company  that  sells  is  expected  to  repurchase  the 
stock  when  it  regains  its  financial  strensh.  Stable  shareholders  do  not 
typically  come  to  stockholders’  meetings,  but  routinely  give  their  proxy 
votes  to  the  top  managers  of  the  companies.  Besides  being  willing  to 
forgo  capital  gains  and  control  rights,  stable  shareholders  have  also,  over 
time,  been  increasingly  willing  to  accept  low  levels  of  dividend  yields, 
given  the  market  value  of  the  stock  that  they  hold.  These  actions  by  sta- 
ble  shareholders  make  Japanese  cross-shareholding  in  effect  a  system 
whereby  the  Japanese  business  community  protects  the  power  of  corpo- 
rate  managers  to  control  the  allocation  of  the  resources  and  returns  of 
their  companies. 
Those  stockholders  who  would  like  to  exercise  their  voice  find  that  they 
are  given  little  chance  to  do  so.  It  has  long  been  the  practice  for  most 
Japanese  companies  to  schedule  their  annual  stockholders’  meetings 
concurrently,  For  example,  on  June  27,  1996,  94  percent  of  1,864  listed 
companies  held  their  meeting  on  the  same  day  and  most  at  the  same 
time.  Their  meetings  lasted  an  average  of  26  minutes  (Morishita  1997a). 
As  for  individual  and  institutional  investors  who  are  not  stable  share- 
holders,  the  only  way  in  which  they  can  generate  financial  returns  is 
through  stock  price  appreciation.  The  Nikkei  225  stock  price  index 
(which  reflects  the  prices  of  225  stocks  listed  on  the  First  Section  of  the 
Tokyo  Stock  Exchange)  appreciated  gradually  during  the  195Os,  stag- 
nated  during  the  196Os,  and  then,  save  for  declines  in  1974  and  1975  in 
the  aftermath  of  the  oil  crisis,  rose  at  a  relatively  rapid  pace  until  1982. 
After  a  small  decline  in  1983  to  about  7,000,  the  Nikkei  exploded  over 
the  next  six  years  to  a  peak  of  38,915  at  the  end  of  1989.  During  the 
1970s  and  198Os,  therefore,  even  as  the  dividend  yields  on  stock  fell 
horn  around  3  percent  to  well  under  1  percent,  these  nonstable  stock- 
holders  were  kept  happy  by  the  run-up  in  the  market  prices  of  corporate 
equities.  However,  that  increase  could  not  be  sustained;  the  Nikkei  fell 
as  low  as  14,309  in  September  1992  and  fluctuated  between  14,600  and 
16,700  during  the  first  half  of  1998. 
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Stable  sharehoIders  throughout  the  1970s  and  198Os,  but  particularly  in 
the  “bubble”  period  of  the  late  198Os,  declined  to  cash  in  on  the  rise  of 
ockr  companies’  stocks.  However,  Japanese  companies  sold  large  quanti- 
ties  of  their  own  stocks  to  the  public  at  inflated  market  prices,  either 
directly  in  the  form  of  equities  or  indirectly  in  the  form  of  convertible 
bonds.  At  the  same  time,  the  volume  of  conversions  of  bonds  to  stocks 
(some  but  not  all  of  which  ended  up  in  the  hands  of  nonstable  sharehold- 
ers)  was  high.  In  addition,  during  the  1980s  companies  issued  large  vol- 
umes  of  warrant  bonds-bonds  with  rights  to  buy  stocks  attached-that 
were  mainly  floated  abroad.  In  the  late  1980s  large  amounts  of  warrants 
were  exercised,  accounting  for  16  percent  of  the  new  shares  issued  by 
listed  Japanese  corporations  between  1987  and  1989. 
Given  these  sales  of  equities,  much  of  which  ended  up  in  the  hands  of 
nonstable  shareholders,  how  then  did  Japanese  corporations  maintain 
levels  of  cross-shareholding  at  about  65  percent  during  the  198Os?  They 
distributed  massive  amounts  of  stock  to  stable  shareholders  as  rights 
issues,  private  placements,  “offerings  to  selected  persons”  for  business 
purposes,  and  stock  dividends  (Japan  Securities  Research  Institute  1996, 
40).  Thus,  while  the  public  was  buying  up  shares  of  Japanese  companies 
at  price-earnings  ratios  that  averaged  about  58  in  1987  and  1988  and  71 
in  1989,  Japanese  companies  were  ensuring  that  stable  shareholders, 
who  sought  neither  capital  gains  nor  high  dividend  yields,  would  con- 
tinue  to  hold  a  marked  majority  of  the  companies’  outstanding  stock. 
From  the  1950s  to  the  1970s  the  growth  of  industrial  companies  was 
highly  dependent  on  their  leveraging  retained  earnings  with  bank 
finance.  Retained  earnings  were  hardly  sufficient  to  fund  the  invest- 
ments  in  technology  and  organization  required  in  this  era  of  rapid 
growth.  To  supplement  retained  earnings,  companies  were  able  to  turn 
to  a  highly  regulated  banking  system  that,  since  the  Meiji  era,  had  been 
structured  to  provide  financial  support  for  industrial  development 
(Lazonick  and  O’Sullivan  1997b).  This  financial  structure  became 
known  as  the  <‘main  bank  system”  (Aoki  and  Patrick  1994).  A  com- 
pany’s  “main  bank”  is  the  financial  institution  that  takes  the  lead  in  pro- 
viding  it  with  loan  finance,  even  though  much,  if  not  most,  of  the  loans 
are  made  to  the  company  by  other  financial  institutions.  The  main  bank 
takes  responsibility  for  monitoring  the  performance  of  the  company  and 
for  leading  the  rescue  should  it  fall  into  financial  distress,  thereby Japanese  Cerporati  Cm  ce  and  Stratea 
permitting  other  banks  to  make  loans  to  the  company  without  having  to 
take  on  these  functions  themselves.  The  result  is  that,  based  on  the  repu- 
tation  of  the  main  bank  and  its  close  relationship  with  a  particular  corn- 
pany,  a  de  ficto loan  syndicate  finances  the  company. 
Under  the  main  bank  system  Japanese  industrial  corporations  were  able 
to  engage  in  developmental  investment  strategies  with  debt-equity  ratios 
far  in  excess  of  those  that  existed  in  the  advanced  economies  of  the 
West  and  with  debt  financing  that  was  almost  entirely  in  the  form  of 
unsecuritized  bank  loans  as  opposed  to  securitized  bonds.  In  1960  bank 
loans  accounted  for  65  percent  of  the  financing  of  large  Japanese  enter- 
prises,  bonds  less  than  7  percent,  paid-in  capital  14  percent,  and  reserves 
14  percent  (Teranishi  1994).  For  the  period  1962  to  1979  bank  loans  as 
a  percent  of  all  sources  of  funds  to  the  nonfinancial  corporate  sector 
averaged  45  percent  in  Japan,  19  percent  in  the  United  States,  24  per- 
cent  in  Germany,  and  21  percent  in  Britain.  During  the  second  half  of 
the  1970s  Japanese  bank  finance  declined  to  42  percent,  down  from  SO 
percent  during  the  first  half  of  the  decade,  a  trend  away  from  bank 
finance  that  continued  during  the  1980s.  Yet  even  during  the  198Os, 
bank  loans  as  a  percent  of  all  nonfinancial  corporate  funds  were  34  per- 
cent  in  Japan,  15  percent  in  the  United  States,  19  percent  in  Germany, 
and  21  percent  in  Britain  (Aoki,  Patrick,  and  Sheard  1994). 
Besides  the  Industrial  Bank  of  Japan  (the  most  important  long-term 
credit  bank)  the  most  significant  main  banks  are  the  city  banks  that  are 
part  of  the  Big  Six  enterprise  groups  (k&o  dudan).  These  enterprise 
groups  are  also  called  “horizontal  keiretsu,”  because  they  link  together  a 
number  of  powerful  companies  across  an  array  of  industries.  The  city 
banks  of  these  groups  are  the  recently  merged  Bank  of  Tokyo-Mitsubishi 
Bank,  Sakura  Bank  (another  merger  of  the  1990s  that  includes  the  for- 
mer  Mitsui  Bank),  Sumitomo  Bank,  Fuji  Bank,  DaidIchi  Kangyo  Bank, 
and  Sanwa  Bank. 
In  1987  the  nonfinancial  enterprises  that  were  part  of  the  Big  Six  hori- 
zontal  keiretsu  included  163  parent  (or  core)  companies,  4,960  sub* 
sidiaries  (in  which  the  group  held  more  than  50  percent  of  the  stock), 
and  6,875  afiliates  (in  which  the  group  held  between  10  percent  and  SO 
percent  of  the  stock).  The  core  companies  alone  accounted  for  13  per+ 
cent  of  assets  and  1.5  percent  of  sales  in  the  Japanese  economy;  with  all 
14  Public  Poiicy  B&f of  the  subsidiaries  and  affiliates,  these  enterprises  accounted  for  27  per- 
cent  of  assets  and  25  percent  of  sales  (Maruyama  1992).  Each  of  these 
enterprise  groups  has  a  president’s  council,  consisting  of  rhe  presidents  of 
the  parent  companies  in  the  group  (ranging  from  20  companies  in  the 
Sumitomo  council  to  47  companies  in  the  Dai-Ichi  Kangin  council). 
The  presidents  discuss  matters  of  common  concern,  but  the  councils 
have  no  legal  means  to  force  member  enterprises  to  act  as  part  of  a  col- 
lectivity  (berlach  I992,237-238). 
In  addition  to  the  horizontal  keiretm,  “vertical  k&e&’  emerged  during 
the  1950s  and  1960s.  Core  companies  of  vertical  keiretsu  provide  devel- 
opment  finance,  ofien  substantial,  to  large  numbers  of  subsidiaries  that 
supply  them  with  goods  and  services,  either  directly  or  through  a  chain 
of  suppliers  and  distributors.  The  finance  may  be  in  the  form  of  equity 
stakes  in  and  loans  to  the  subsidiaries.  To  make  matters  more  compli- 
cated  in  the  dense  web  of  business  relations  that  tie  the  fates  of  Japanese 
companies  together,  many  of  the  core  companies  of  the  vertical  keiretsu 
have  relations  with  the  horizontal  keirec.~  and  both  cross-shareholding 
and  bank  lending  transcend  keiretsu  relations. 
Much  has  been  made  by  students  of  the  main  bank  system  of  the  role  of 
the  main  banks  in  monitoring  corpotate  management  in  an  industrial 
economy  in  which  companies  are  clearly  not  run  for  stockholders  (Aoki, 
Patrick,  and  Sheard  1994).  During  the  1950s  and  196Os,  when  the 
Japanese  economy  and  the  industrial  companies  that  constituted  its 
developmental  core  faced  uncertain  futures,  main  banks  did  have  to 
know  to  whom  they  were  making  financial  commitments.  As  the  fInan- 
cial  institution  that  was  obliged  to  lead  the  effort  to  revitalize  an  ailing 
company,  the  main  bank  had  to  understand  the  long-run  potential  of  a 
company  if  and  when  circumstances  placed  it  in  severe  financial  diffi- 
culty  (Sheard  1994). 
But  by  the  1970s  and  198Os,  when  the  Japanese  economy  and  its  core 
companies  had  overcome  the  inherent  uncertainties  of  the  developmen- 
tal  process,  the  monitoring  role  of  the  main  banks  became  virtually  rou- 
tine.  Indeed,  so  as  not  to  be  overly  dependent  on  one  main  bank,  strong 
industrial  companies  .sought  bank  loans  from  a  greater  range  of  sources 
than  they  had  before  or  used  retained  earnings  or  funds  raised  on  the 
securities  market  to  pay  off  large  amounts  of  their  bank  debt.  Awash  with 
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cash  and  having  lost  their  best  customers,  the  banks  turned  to  making 
loans  to  real  estate  developers  and  stock  speculators,  among  others. 
When  the  “bubble  economy”  burst  in  1990,  the  collapse  of  land  and 
stock  markets  left  the  banking  system  with  a  massive  bad  loan  problem 
(Watanabe  1996). 
Even  when,  in  earlier  decades,  the  Japanese  banks  had  more  power  over 
how  the  industrial  corporations  to  which  they  lent  allocated  their 
resources  and  returns,  they  were  actors  in  a  highly  regulated  financial 
system  in  which,  given  the  uncertainties  involved,  they  were  willing  to 
take  relatively  low  returns  on  their  lending  activities  to  support  the  suc- 
cess  of  the  industrial  economy.  One  reason  that  banks  were  willing  to 
participate  in  such  a  system  is  that  they  expected  the  government  would 
stand  behind  them  should  the  loans  go  bad.  As  central  participants  in 
the  cross-shareholding  movement,  the  banks  themselves  were  run  not 
for  the  sake  of  their  stockholders  but  for  the  sake  of  developing  the 
economy.  Developing  the  economy  meant  delivering  on  the  promise  of 
lifetime  employment,  not  only  to  the  banks’  employees  but  to  the 
employees  of  the  industrial  enterprises  that  the  banks  helped  to  finance. 
Strategic  Decision  Making  within  the  Management 
Structure:  Labor  Relations 
Japanese  corporations  have  been,  and  continue  to  be,  governed  by  their 
top  managers  as  part  of  a  hierarchical  structure  of  organizational  control. 
Within  the  management  structure  key  allocation  decisions  are  generally 
made  by  a  process  of  consensus  decision  making  that  includes  the  formal 
r-in@  seti,  circulation  of  a  memorandum  to  be  signed  by  all  concerned, 
and  the  informal  nemwati,  a  process  of  seeking  out  differences  of  opin- 
ion  and  generating  discussion  before  an  important  decision  is  made 
(Abegglen  and  Stalk  1985,208;  Ballon  1996,54-55).  Top  managers  ulti- 
mately  make  the  allocation  decisions,  but  they  are  integrated  into  a 
process  that  makes  them  aware  of  the  capabilities  and  expectations  of 
those  responsible  for  implemenmtion  (Nonaka  and  Takeuchi  1995). 
This  process  extends  down  the  hierarchy.to  the  enterprise  unions  through 
joint  consultation  committees  (JCCs)  that  involve  labor  and  manage- 
ment  (Nakamura  1997;  Shimokawa  1994,  ch.  3).  Most  top  managers, 
having  come  up  through  the  company  and  having  been  union  members 
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early  in  their  career,  have  participated  in  JCCs  on  the  labor  side.  For 
example,  a  1978  survey  by  Nikkeiren  (Japan  Federation  of  Employers’ 
Associations)  found  that  two  out  of  three  of  the  major  companies  had 
executives-accounting  for  almost  one  in  six  executives-who  had  at 
one  time  served  the  company  as  union  officials  (Maruyama  1992,  196). 
Union  officials,  who  are  company  employees,  hold  regularly  scheduled 
conferences  with  management  at  different  levels  of  the  enterprise  to 
resolve  issues  concerning  remuneration,  work  conditions,  work  organiza- 
tion,  interdepartmental  and  intercompany  transfers,  and  production. 
Japanese  enterprise  unions  have  no  explicit  rights  to  engage  in  the  execu- 
tive  or  supervisory  institutions  of  corporate  governance,  in  contrast  to 
work  councils  and  codetermination  in  Germany  (G’Sulhvan  1998).  In 
large  companies  JCCs  perform  an  information-gathering  function  for 
both  management  and  labor  that  is  a  preliminav  to  collective  bargaining. 
In  smaller  companies,  in  which  enterprise  unions  are  absent,  collective 
bargaining  takes  place  in  the  JCCs  (Kuwahara  1982,Sl). 
JCCs  can  make  management  aware  of  what  labor  wants,  but  they  cer- 
tainly  do  not  give  labor  the  power  to  influence  the  allocations  of 
resources  and  returns  against  the  wishes  of  top  management  (Nakamura 
1997).  Since  the  1970s  overt  and  prolonged  labor-management  strife 
has  been  virtually  nonexistent  in  major  Japanese  companies,  largely 
because  of  the  commitment  of  management  to  lifetime  employment 
and  management’s  willingness,  behind  the  wall  of  cross-shareholding,  to 
share  the  gains  of  the  enterprise  with  employees.  In  turn,  workers’ 
claims  on  enterprise  earnings  take  into  account  financial  requirements 
for  reinvestment  and  the  performance  of  the  economy  as  a  whole. 
Workers  have  been  willing  to  restrain  their  demands  for  pay  increases 
on  the  understanding  that  the  enterprise  will  retain  and  invest  what 
they  do  not  take  now  in  ways  that  will  benefit  them  later.  Guiding  this 
wage  bargaining  at  the  enterprise  level  is  a  comparison  of  enterprise 
performance  with  the  national  benchmark  for  enterprise  wage  increases 
created  by  &unto,  or  the  Spring  Offensive-the  annual  public  debate 
over  the  possibilities  for  augmenting  the  earnings  of  Japanese  employees 
without  jeopardizing  the  sustainable  prosperity  of  the  nation  (Sake 
1997;  Dore  1987,70-72). 
A  key  issue  other  than  wages  for  the  enterprise  unions  is  whether  to 
cooperate  with  management  in  its  plans  for  the  reallocation  of  labor. 
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Keeping  people  employed  over  a  lifetime  means  putting  them  in  jobs 
where  they  can  generate  the  productivity  that  can  justify  their  pay.  For 
employees  in  their  twenties,  thirties,  and  forties,  the  key  to  labor  alloca- 
tion  is  their  integration  into  a  process  of  organizational  learning  that 
enables  them  to  become  mote  productive  as  they  receive  the  higher 
earnings  that  occur  under  the  seniority  pay  system  (n&o).  When  they 
reach  their  fifties,  however,  the  key  to  labor  allocation  is  putting 
employees  in  jobs  where  they  can  live  off  their  experience  hut  often  at 
lower  pay,  and  in  many  cases  this  means  a  transfer  to  subsidiary  enter- 
prises.  In  the  1990s  such  transfers  have  hccome  much  more  central  to 
the  maintenance  of  lifetime  employment  as  an  institution  of  Japanese 
corporate  governance. 
Pressures  to  Change  Corporate  Governance  and  Strategy 
The  Banking  Crisis 
The  banking  crisis  of  the  1990s  is  an  example  of  what  happens  when 
financial  markets  rather  than  productive  organizations  drive  the  alloca- 
tion  of  resources  in  the  economy.’  During  the  1950s  and  1960s  the 
Japanese  erected  a  highly  regulated  financial  system  that  was  extremely 
effective  in  supporting  the  development  of  the  Japanese  economy 
(Suzuki  1987;  Aoki  and  Patrick  1994).  Into  the  1990s  the  Ministry  of 
Finance  and  the  Bank  of  Japan  supported  a  range  of  highly  specialized 
private-sector  institutions  in  financing  industrial  development  (Sakae 
1996).  With  all  financial  vehicles  moving  in  the  same  direction  and  at 
the  same  pace  under  this  coordinated  system,  the  “convoy  fleet  system” 
(gososendun)  became  the  popular  name  for  the  Japanese  financial  infra- 
structure  (Morishita  1996). 
Since  the  start  of  the  199Os,  financing  to  Japanese  business  enterprises 
has  come  from  six  main  sources: 
l  3  long-term  credit  hanks,  which  make  long-term  loans  to  major 
indusrrial  enterprises 
l  7  trust  banks  and  27  life  insurance  companies,  which  make  long- 
term  loans  to  large  companies,  but  increasingly  since  the  1980s  have 
absorbed  corporate  government  securities,  both  domestic,and  foreign 
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l  11  city  banks  (centered  in  Tokyo,  Osaka,  and  Nagoya  and  reduced  to 
10  city  banks  with  the  merger  of  the  Bank  of  Tokyo  and  the 
Mitsubishi  Bank  in  1995),  which  make  ostensibly  short-term  loans, 
many  of  which  have  been  continually  rolled  over  to  finance  long- 
term  investments,  to  major  companies 
l  64  regional  banks  spread  out  over  Japan’s  47  prefectures,  which 
extend  loans  to  larger  regional  businesses 
l  66  second-tier  regional  banks,  which  cater  to  the  financial  needs  of 
small  and  medium  enterprises  (SMEs) 
l  large  numbers  of  credit  unions  and  associations  and  agricultural  insti- 
tutions  (ski&n  banks),  which  extend  loans  to  small  enterprises  and 
farmers 
The  Bank  of  Japan  has  supported  this  system  of  business  finance  by 
maintaining  a  structure  of  low  and  stable  interest  rates  and  by  extending 
“overloans”  to  banks,  esp’ecially  the  city  banks,  so  that  banks  could 
increase  their  volume  of  business  loans  beyond  that  permitted  by  their 
deposit  base  (Suzuki  1987).  The  Ministry  of  Finance’s  Trust  Fund 
Bureau,  which  controls  the  investment  of  Japan’s  postal  savings  deposits 
and  public  pension  funds,  has  supported  the  system  through  the  Fiscal 
Investment  and  Loan  Program  (zaito)  by  financing  infrastructural  invest- 
ments,  small  and  medium  enterprises,  and  public  works  (including  hous- 
ing)  and  by  absorbing  the  debentures  of  long-term  credit  banks  (which 
have  no  depository  base,  other  than  their  corporate  customers)  and 
other  financial  institutions  (Nakamura  and  Yamada  1996,  131-136; 
Endo  1996).  In  addition,  z&to  draws  on  funds  that  the  Ministry  of  Posts 
and  Telecommunications  controls  in  the  postal  insurance  system. 
Z&o  must  generate  sufficient  returns  to  cover  the  savings,  pension,  and 
insurance  obligations  to  households  for  the  funds  that  it  uses.  But  these 
rates  are  kept  lo?  by  Japan’s  regulated  interest  rate  structure,  and  the 
Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  Bank  of  Japan  coordinate  their  policies  and 
operations.  Maim  functions  as  a  second  or  shadow  government  spending 
budget,  but  one  that  does  not  rely  on  either  tax  revenues  or  public  debt 
issues  (Suzuki  1997a).  During  the  first  half  of  the  1980s  investments  and 
loans  made  with  Z&O  funds  were  about  50  percent  of  the  government’s 
general  account  appropriations.  This  proportion  increased  sharply  in  the 
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Table  2  Bad  Loans  of  Japanese  Financial  Instirutions, 
(Percent) 
September  30,  1997 
Institution 
City  banks 
brig-term 
credit  banks 
Trust  barks 
Regional  banks 
Total  banks 
Share  of  All  Bad  Loans/  Bad  Loans/  Provisions/ 
Bad  Lmns  Assets  AlI  Loans  Bad  Loans-’ 
34.41  2.22  3.45  69.02 
10.22  3.37  5.63  58.90 
13.90  1.56  6.86  55.52 
20.33  2.06  2.95  59.98 
78.86  2.12  3.81  63.00 
Shinkin  banks  12.27  3.03  4.82  49.45 
Credit  unions  and 
associations  7.25  8.00  12.10  12.81 
Agricultural 
cooperatives  1.62  0.45  1.96  141.39 
Total  100.0  2.19  4.05  58.97 
“‘Provisionsbd  Loans”  is  the  amount  of  f&Is  placed  on  txzserve to  absorb  had  loans  as  a 
proportion  of  had  loans  outstanding. 
SOWW:  Nikkei  Weekly,_&m  Economic  Almanac 1998  (Nihon  Keizei  Shimbun),  11. 
accumulation  of  bad  loans.’  In  March  1992  the  Ministry  of  Finance 
revealed  the  extent  of  the  bad  loan  problem,  and  the  Bank  of  Japan  cut 
the  discount  rate  to  an  all-time  low  of  1.75  percent  to  help  debtors  make 
their  payments.  Nevertheless,  the  volume  of  bad  loans  continued  to 
increase,  and  financial  institutions  began  to  write  off  large  amounts 
(Nakamura  and  Yamada  1998,137-143). 
After  credit  unions  and  associations,  hardest  hit  in  terms  of  bad  loans  as 
a  proportion  of  all  loans  have  been  the  long-term  credit  banks  and  the 
trust  banks  (see  Table  2).  But,  given  the  size  of  their  loan  portfolios,  a 
disproportionate  volume  of  bad  loans  has  been  concentrated  in  the  city 
banks,  which  in  September  1997  accounted  for  34.41  percent  of  all  bad 
loans  in  the  private  sector  financial  system.  Even  though  the  trust  banks 
had  a  relatively  low  proportion  of  their  total  assets  in  loans,  they  also 
had  the  lowest  level  of  loan  loss  reserve  and  hidden  reserve  coverage 
among  the  major  bank  lenders. 
In  September  1997  disclosed  bad  loans  for  Japanese  banks  were  esti- 
mated  at  28  trillion  yen,  down  from  34  trillion  yen  in  March  1996  but 
up  from  13  trillion  yen  in  March  1995  (Nikkei  Weekly  1998,  10-11; 
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Takatsuki  1996,  15).  Banks,  insurance  companies,  and  securities  cornpa- 
nies  had  made  a  significant  proportion  of  these  bad  loans  to  jusen,  loan 
companies  that  were  incorporated  in  the  1970s  for  the  purpose  of  mak- 
ing  housing  loans  to  individuals  and  that  borrowed  f%nds  from  the  finan- 
cial  institutions.  But  in  the  1980s  many  of  the  banks  turned  to  making 
housing  loans  themselves,  thus  leading  the  jusen  to  turn  instead  to 
financing  real  estate  development  projects.  When,  in  1990,  at  the  onset 
of  the  financial  crisis,  the  Ministry  of  Finance  introduced  regulations 
that  limited  bank  loans  to  real  estate  companies  and  nonbank  lenders, 
the  jusen  turned  to  the  cash-rich  agricultural  cooperatives. 
As  land  prices  plummeted  in  the  early  199Os,  the  jusen  loans  went  bad. 
In  September  1995  seven  jusen  companies  had  12.9  trillion  yen  in  loans 
outstanding,  of  which  about  two-thirds  were  problem  loans.  About  48 
percent  of  these  borrowings  came  from  banks  (of  which  over  one-third 
was  from  trust  banks)  and  another  42  percent  from  agricultural  coopem 
tives.  At  the  end  of  1995  the  Ministry  of  Finance  ordered  the  banks  that 
had  founded  the  jusen  companies  to  write  off  all  of  their  loans  (3.5  tril- 
lion  yen)  to  affiliated  jusen  and  45  percent  of  their  loans  (1.7  trillion 
yen)  to  nonaffiliated  jusen.  The  ministry  contributed  685  billion  yen  of 
public  funds  to  wind  down  the  jusen  companies,  thus  enabling  the  ag+ 
cultural  cooperatives  to  write  off  only  530  billion  yen.  In  July  1996  the 
government  set  up  the  Housing  Loan  Administration  Corporation  to 
take  over  about  6.8  trillion  yen  of  the  loans  outstanding  of  the  seven 
failed  jusen  (Morishita  1997b,  20-21). 
A  number  of  failures  of  smaller  banks  (second-tier  regional  banks)  and 
cooperatives  occurred  through  1996.  The  first  big  bank  failure  occurred 
in  November  1997  with  the  bankruptcy  of  the  Hokkaido  Takushoku 
Bank,  the  weakest  of  the  ten  city  banks  (Yokota  1997b).  It  was  expected 
that  it  would  require  1  trillion  yen  from  the  Deposit  Insurance 
Corporation  to  cover  the  bank’s  bad  loans.  The  failure  of  the  Hokkaido 
Takushoku  Bank  occurred  in  spite  of  the  Ministry  of  Finance’s  pledge  in 
the  early  1990s  that  none  of  Japan’s  major  banks  would  collapse.  In  the 
aftermath  of  the  Hokkaido  Takushoku  failure,  there  were  proposals  to 
use  postal  savings  money-managed  by  &o-to  buy  subordinated  bonds 
issued  by  banks  to  supplement  funds  available  to  the  Deposit  Insurance 
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company,  Yamaichi,  also  collapsed,  raising  fears  of  a  recall  of  foreign 
loans  (including  money  invested  in  U.S.  Treasury  bills),  which,  in  the 
midst  of  financial  failures  in  a  number  of  other  Asian  economies,  could 
have  triggered  an  international  liquidity  crisis.  In  March  1998  the  gov- 
ernment  implemented  a  2.1  trillion  yen  plan  to  provide  financial  support 
to  the  nine  remaining  city  banks,  the  three  long-term  credit  banks,  six 
trust  banks,  and  three  regional  banks  (Ishikawa  1998). 
This  crisis  in  the  Japanese  financial  sector  has  certainly  contributed  to 
the  prolonged  recession  of  the  Japanese  economy  in  the  1990s.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  Japan’s  industrial  economy  is  strong.  While  the 
financial  institutions  wallow  in  bad  loans,  most  major  industrial  enter- 
prises  are  cash  rich.  In  1991  the  ratio  of  their  net  financial  assets  to  GDP 
was  minus  10  percent,  in  1996  plus  6  percent  (Koll  1997,  28).  Japan 
remains  a  creditor  nation  with  a  high  savings  rate,  Japanese  companies 
are  investing  in  new  technologies,  and  the  Japanese  economy  is  generat- 
ing  persistent  trade  surpluses.  Japan’s  unemployment  rate,  4.1  percent  in 
April  1998,  is  high  by  the  nation’s  postwar  standards  but  low  by  world 
standards.  Despite  the  financial  turmoil,  Japan’s  formidable  productive 
system  is  not  in  danger  of  collapse. 
Indeed,  the  Japanese  financial  crisis  of  the  1990s  is  the  result  not  of  an 
underlying  weakness  in  the  productive  capacity  of  the  Japanese  economy, 
but  of  the  transformation  of  the  role  of  the  nation’s  financial  sector  with 
the  maturation  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  of  perhaps  the  most  highly  suc- 
cessful  national  economic  development  effort  in  world  history.  The  origin 
of  the  crisis  lies  in  the  participation  of  financial  institutions  in  the  unreg- 
ulated  financial  speculation  to  which  the  phenomenal  success  of  the 
Japanese  industrial  economy  in  international  competition  in  the  1980s 
gave  rise.  During  the  1980s  the  returns  on  the  wealth  that  Japan’s  indus- 
trial  development  had  created  since  the  1950s  far  surpassed  the  ongoing 
investment  requirements  of  the  Japanese  economy,  so  that  even  within  a 
highly  regulated  financial  system  this  surplus  wealth  was  permitted  to  find 
outlets  in  real  estate  and  corporate  stock  speculation.  Thus,  in  the  wake 
of  the  very  real  and  ongoing  success  of  Japan’s  industrial  economy  in 
international  competition,  the  “bubble  economy”  emerged.’ 
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In  the  process,  Japan’s  banks  became  less  involved  in  financing  the 
development  of  the  industrial  economy  and  turned  to  fLeiing  speculative 
fever.  The  very  success  of  the  industrial  economy  made  corporations 
much  less  reliant  on  the  major  banks  to  mobilize  capital  for  their  further 
development.  In  search  of  new  business  in  the  198Os,  Japanese  banks 
engaged  in  lending  activities  that  contributed  to  expanding  the  bubble 
until  it  bunt.  When,  in  1990,  the  stock  and  land  markets  crashed,  much 
of  the  value  of  the  assets  against  which  Japanese  banks  had  lent  money 
vanished  into  thin  air. 
During  the  1950s  and  1960s  the  role  of  the  financial  sector  was  to  corn- 
mit  finance  to  industrial  development  through  the  provision  of  low-cost 
and  secure  loans  to  industrial  enterprises  whose  innovative  potential  was 
yet  to  be  revealed  and  whose  prospects  for  financial  returns  were  hence 
highly  uncertain.  The  banks’  access  to  Bank  of  Japan  preferential  “over- 
Ioan”  credits  and  Trust  Fund  Bunzau  investments  in  bank  debentures  was 
conditional  on  their  willingness  to  play  this  developmental  role.  By  the 
19’IOs  the  succe&ul  development  of  the  industrial  companies  that  had 
been  central  to  the  emergence  of  Japan  as  a  major  economic  power 
meant  thar  they  had  much  less  need  for  the  support  of  the  bankiig  sy~ 
tern.  These  industrial  enterprises  were  now  generating  larger  and  more 
secure  streams  of  retained  earnings  that  they  could  use  to  finance  their 
further  growth,  and  for  their  additional  funding  requirements  they  could 
go  directly  to  securities  markets. 
Moreover,  with  accumulated  productive  capacity  in  place,  by  the  late 
1970s  companies  did  not  have  to  invest  as  much  capital  as  in  the  high. 
growth  era  to  get  a  given  amount  of  sales  revenues,  They  could  also  use 
retained  earnings  and  securities  issues  to  reduce  their  bank  debt.  For 
Japanese  nonfinancial  corporations,  internal  sources  of  finance  (depreci- 
ation  and  retained  earnings)  accounted  for  58  percent  of  the  total 
sources  of  funds  in  1980.  In  1985  it  was  54  percent  and  in  1989  it  was  51 
percent.  Of  the  external  sources  of  finance,  in  1980  equity  and  debt 
offerings  accounted  for  only  12  percent  and  bank  Ioans  for  87  percent- 
proportions  that  were  in  line  with  the  external  sources  during  the  1960s 
and  1970s.  In  1985,  however,  equity  and  debt  offerings  had  risen  to  17 
percent  of  external  finance  and  bank  loans  had  fallen  to  81  percent, 
with  other  sources  of  funds  accounting  for  the  other  2  percent.  In  1989 
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proportion  of  securities  offerings  was  27  percent  and  bank  loans  only 
percent,  with  commercia1  paper  (unused  before  the  late  1980s) 
3unting  for  5  percent  and  other  sources  the  remaining  4  percent 
ban  Securities  Research  Institute  1996,  2-3). 
n  1965  through  1977  the  growth  rate  of  bank  borrowing  by  large 
mfacturing  companies  was  persistently  positive,  averaging  about  4 
Lent  per  year,  whereas  from  1983  to  1989  this  growth  rate  was  persis- 
ly  negative,  at  minus  I  to  minus  2  percent  per  year.  In  1975  retained 
lings  accounted  for  10  percent  of  the  capitalization  of  these  compa- 
,  paid-in  capital  20  percent,  corporate  bonds  5  percent,  and  borrow- 
65  percent.  In  1990  retained  earnings  had  risen  to  28  percent, 
!-in  capital  to  24  percent,  and  corporate  bonds  to  26  percent  and 
owings  had  fallen  to  22  percent  (Watanabe  1996,  100).  Depending 
:he  terms  under  which  they  couId  raise  funds  on  capital  markets! 
1 when  these  companies  did  not  need  to  float  securities  to  fund  new 
luctive  investment,  it  could  be  worth  their  while  to  do  so  to  pay  off 
c  debt  or  even  simply  to  build  up  cash  reserves  (Lake  1990).  Hence, 
same  developmental  process  that  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  eliminated 
uncertainty  inherent  in  bank  loans  to  industrial  enterprises  also 
Jled  these  industrial  enterprises  to  reduce  their  reliance  on  bank 
s.  Especially  during  the  bubble  economy  of  the  late  198Os,  as  price- 
ings  ratios  of  corporate  stock  increased  dramatically,  listed  compa- 
found  that  they  could  raise  large  sums  by  floating  equities.  In 
tion,  the  liberalization  of  the  access  of  Japanese  companies  to  inter- 
Inal  capital  markets  in  the  mid  1980s  led  many  companies  to  engage 
it&~,  or  “financial  engineering,”  which  included  significant  issues  of 
rertible  (including  warrant)  bonds  as  well  as  commercial  paper  on 
gn  markets. 
parties  listed  on  the  Tokyo  Stock  Exchange  raised  about  2  trillion  yen 
Ially  through  the  sale  of  convertible  bonds  in  the  1970s  and  about  4 
n  yen  annually  in  the  first  half  of  the  1980s.  In  the  second  half  sales 
nvertible  bonds  shot  up,  teaching  11  trillion  yen  in  1987  and  peaking 
. trillion  yen  in  1989  (Watanabe  1996.96).  Warrant  bonds  were  par- 
srly  attractive  to  foreign  lenders  because  they  could  sell  the  detach- 
warrants,  which  could  be  converted  to  stock.  About  80  to  90  percent 
ese  warrants  were  sold  back  to  Japanese  investors.  The  value  of  the 
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Table  3  Net  Change  in  Japanese  Bank  Loans,  March  1985  to  March  1990 
Change  in  Amount  Share  of  Net  Change 
(in  trillions  of  yen)  (percent) 
.-  City  and  Long-Terta  City  and  Long-Term 
Regional  Credit  and  All  Regional  Credit  and  All 
Banks  Trust  Banks  Banks  Banks  Trust  Banks  Banks 
All  corporations  6x4  31.2  96.6  69.5  93.4  75.8 
Manufacturers  -1.5  -3.3  4.7  -1.6  -9.9  -3.7 
Real  estate  and 
construction  22.3  7.7  30.0  23.7  23.1  23.5 
Nonbanks  15.4  21.0  36.4  16.4  62.9  28.6 
Others  29.1  5.8  34.9  30.9  17.4  27.4 
Individuals  27.3  1.3  28.5  29.0  3.9  22.4 
Others  1.4  0.9  2.3  1.5  2.7  1.8 
Total  94.1  33.4  127.4  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source:  Minors  Nakamura  and  Koji  Yamada,  “Financial  Institutions  of  Japan,”  in  Shigenobu 
Hayakawa,  ed.,  _&mese  Firumcial Murkers (Cambridge:  Gosham,  1996),  139. 
detachable  wartant  in  the  booming  stock  market  meant  that  instead  of  a 
bond  coupon  of  about  5  percent  that  would  be  needed  to  float  regular  con- 
vertible  bonds,  Japanese  industrial  enterprises  were  able  to  float  warrant 
bonds  with  a  coupon  of  1  percent  (Lake  1990;  Smith  1993,  118-119). 
One  Tokyo-based  analyst  of  a  western  money-market  firm  recognized  that 
in  securing  these  cheap  funds  on  international  securities  markets,  Japanese 
industrial  enterprises  were  borrowing  for  the  future:  “It  was  an  important 
part  of  the  country’s  rise  to  industrial-empire  status.  The  borrowing  win- 
dow  was  too  good  to  overlook,  and  corporate  treasuries  exploited  Japan’s 
rise  to  the  hilt.  What  is  most  impressive  is  that  all  this  borrowing  took 
place  even  though  they  did  not  need  the  money.“’ 
Because  of  the  dramatic  decline  in  companies’  reliance  on  bank  borrow- 
ing,  during  the  late  1970s  and  even  more  so  in  the  1980s  the  city  banks, 
long-term  credit  banks,  and  trust  banks  that  made  loans  to  the  larger 
Japanese  industrial  enterprises  found  themselves  not  only  losing  their 
best  customers,  but  also  amassing  huge  volumes  of  loanable  funds,  in  part 
because  of  large  increases  in  deposits  by  the  very  same  corporate  cus- 
tomers  (Takatsuki  1996,  59).  Table  3  shows  the  resulting  changes  in  the 
banks’  loan  portfolios.  Loans  to  manufxturers  declined,  while  loans  to 
real  estate  and  construction,  nonbank,  other  corporations,  and  mdividu- 
als  shot  up.  Much  of  these  funds  took  the  form  of  residential  mortgages, 
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loans  hacked  hy  real  estate  as  collateral,  or  loans  to  nonbank  corpora- 
tions  such  as  the  jusen  companies,  which  used  the  funds  to  make  real 
estate  loans. 
Land,  of  course,  has  always  been  a  scarce  and  hence  valuable  asset  in 
Japan,  especially  in  the  Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka  triangle  where  Japan’s 
industrial  development  has  heen  concentrated.  Not  only  is  usable  land 
scarce,  but  what  land  there  is  does  not  easily  change  hands.  in  Tokyo  the 
annual  turnover  of  land  is  about  2  percent,  so  a  demand  increase  presses 
against  a  highly  inelastic  supply  (Ziemba  1991.51).  During  the  first  half 
of  the  1980s  the  value  of  land  for  commercial,  industrial,  and  residential  I 
uses  in  the  six  largest  cities  rose  by  about  40  percent;  in  the  second  half 
of  the  1980s  it  rose  by  over  200  percent  (Shimizu  1992,  32;  Ziemba 
1991,4749). 
Real  estate  loans  went  from  an  average  of  just  over  1  trillion  yen  per  year 
in  the  first  half  of  the  1980s  to  about  7  trillion  yen  per  year  in  the  second 
half,  peaking  at  almost  11  trillion  yen  in  1987  (Ziemba  1991,  55).  The 
long-term  credit  banks,  city  banks,  and  trust  banks-for  which  loans  to 
large  companies  had  been  an  important  part  of  their  busineebecame 
heavily  involved  in  loans  related  to  real  estate.  The  city  banks  increased 
residential  mortgages  from  ahout  8  percent  of  their  loan  portfolios  in 
1984  to  16  percent  in  1990.  Long-term  credit  banks  increased  Loans  to 
the  real  estate  industry  from  less  than  4  percent  of  their  portfolios  in 
1984  to  over  13  percent  in  1990,  and  trust  banks  increased  such  loans 
from  about  12  percent  to  16  percent.  In  addition,  loans  to  nonbank 
financial  institutions,  which  in  turn  lent  heavily  to  real  esrare,  amounted 
to  ordy  2  percent  of  the  loan  portfolios  of  long-term  credit  banks  and  8 
percent  of  the  portfolios  of  trust  companies  in  1983  but  22  percent  and 
25  percent,  respectively,  in  1990.n  Adding  to  the  upward  pressure  on 
land  prices  were  increases  in  government  loans  for  housing  purposes. 
Accompanying  the  rise  in  land  prices  was  a  rise  in  stock  prices,  appar- 
ently  with  stock  prices  leading  land  prices  (Ziemba  1991).  As  price- 
earning  ratios  of  listed  stocks  soared,  it  was  tempting  to  look  to  the 
increase  in  the  value  of  land  as  a  justification.  Fortunes  that  were  made 
on  the  stock  market  could  be  turned  to  the  purchase  of  land.  On  the 
supply  side,  the  willingness  of  banks  to  lend  during  the  1980s  was  very 
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much  based  on  the  notion  that  land  and  stock  prices  would  remain 
high.  Indeed,  during  the  height  of  the  bubble  of  the  late  198Os,  there 
was  a  tendency  for  banks  to  increase  the  proportion  of  loans  backed  by 
land  that  was  valued  at  increasingly  inflated  prices.  Furthermore,  banks 
sold  and  bought  back  some  of  their  cross-shareholdings  to  increase 
their  capitalization  and  thereby  augmented  the  volume  of  loans  that 
they  could  make  under  the  equity  capital  requirements  for  banks 
engaged  in  domestic  and  international  lending  (Nakamura  and 
Yamada  1998,  136-137).  The  dramatic  decline  in  stock  prices  and  land 
prices  since  1990  have  wiped  out  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  col- 
lateral  on  the  loans  that  the  banks  and  other  financial  institutions 
made  in  the  1980s. 
Growing  Intergenerational  Dependence 
For  the  financial  system  to  aid  the  process  of  economic  development,  it 
needs  to  commit  financial  resources  to  enterprises  that,  through  invest- 
ments  in  organization  and  technology,  can  develop  and  utilize  produc- 
tive  resources.  At  the  same  time,  a  national  financial  system  has  another 
fUnction  to  perform.  In  addition  to  its  role  in  the  process  of  value  cre- 
ation,  it  also  has  a  role  in  the  process  of  value  extraction.  The  process  of 
economic  development  entails  not  only  the  allocation  of  financial 
resources  to  the  development  and  utilization  of  productive  capabilities, 
but  also  the  allocation  of  financial  returns  to  participants  in  the  process. 
Key  participants  are  employees,  who  receive  their  returns  in  the  forms  of 
a  stream  of  earnings  while  they  are  employed  and  old-age  benefits  when 
they  are  in  retirement. 
Value  extraction  and  value  creation  can  reinforce  each  other.  On  the 
supply  side,  the  expectation  of  a  stream  of  earnings  horn  participation  in 
a  successful  enterprise  can  give  employees  the  incentive  to  engage  in 
those  activities  that  create  the  earnings  they  can  extract.  On  the 
demand  side,  the  success  in  creating  value  of  large  numbers  of  enterprises 
in  a  national  economy  provides  earnings  to  large  numbers  of  employees 
who  can  absorb  the  products  that  these  enterprises  produce  and  hence 
generate  the  financial  returns  that  enterprises  can  reallocate.  These 
returns  can  be  enhanced  by  developing  products  that,  even  with  high 
earnings  for  national  employees,  can  augment  the  enterprises’  market 
shares  in  international  competition. 
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remain  productive  forever,  particularly  when,  as  in  the  case  of  Japan,  the 
very  success  of  its  process  of  economic  development  has  been  a  signifi- 
cant  factor  in  permitting  people  to  live  longer.  To  support  people  in 
retirement  requires  a  sustainable  balance  between  allocation  of  financial 
resources  to  support  productive  employment  and  allocation  of  returns  to 
employees  who  have  retired.  Such  a  balance  is  easier  to  achieve  in  the 
presence  of  investments  in  productive  capabilities  that  make  employees 
more  productive  over  longer  spans  of  their  lives. 
Japan  has  the  most  rapidly  aging  population  in  the  world.  The  propor- 
tion  of  the  population  aged  65  and  older  increased  from  5  percent  in 
1950  to  I5  percent  in  1995,  a  period  during  which  the  proportion  of  the 
U.S.  population  aged  65  and  over  rose  from  8  percent  to  just  over  12 
percent.  In  1995  Japan’s  elderly  population  was  still  a  smaller  propor- 
tion  of  the  total  than  in  most  western  European  nations,  but,  with  the 
proportion  of  elderly  expected  to  rise  to  20  percent  by  2010  and  25  per- 
cent  by  2020,  Japan  is  expected  to  have  the  most  aged  society  in  the 
world  within  the  next  generation  (Seike  1997a,  143;  1997b,  152; 
Bosworth  and  Burtless  1997,ll). 
Driving  this  rapid  aging  of  Japanese  society  is  a  combination  of  longer 
life  expectancies  and  declining  birthrates.  In  1955,  on  the  eve  of  the 
Japanese  high-growth  era,  the  average  life  expectancy  at  birth  was  64 
years  for  men  and  69  years  for  women.  By  1987  these  figures  were  76 
years  for  men  and  81  years  for  women-the  highest  average  life 
expectancies  in  the  world,  a  distinction  that  Japan  still  maintains  (Japan 
Statistics  Bureau  1989,  55).  Meanwhile,  the  birthrate  has  declined  per- 
sistently,  reaching  a  record  low  of  1.43  in  1995  (the  1995  birth  rate  for 
the  United  States  was  2.05  and  for  Germany  1.28).  The  rate  was  so  low 
that  in  1995  fewer  babies  were  botn  in  Japan  than  in  any  year  since 
records  began  to  be  kept,  which  was  1899  (Nikkei  Weekly  1997,142). 
These  demographic  trends  have  generated  a  long-run  problem  of  inter- 
generatiorml  dependence.  In  1990,  17  percent  of  the  Japanese  popula- 
tion  were  in  the  20  to  29  age  group  and  12  percent  were  in  the  60  to  69 
age  group.  The  proportion  of  the  younger  group  rose  to  19  petcent  in  the 
mid  I99Os,  but  will  decline  steadily  into  the  early  decades  of  the  next 
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century.  By  around  2005  the  proportions  will  be  about  equal,  at  15  or  16 
percent,  but  then  the  proportion  of  the  older  group  will  become  increas- 
ingly  greater  than  that  of  the  younger  group  (Seike  1997b,  153).  By 
around  2025  the  proportion  of  those  receiving  government  pension  pay- 
ments  will  have  increased  to  over  40  percent  from  the  current  20  per- 
cent  (Kuwata  1997,37). 
All  Japanese  are  covered  by  national  health  insurance  (with  premiums 
based  on  income)  and  by  government  subsidies  for  retired,  elderly,  and 
low-income  people  (Ogura  1994,  146).  The  public  pension  scheme  is  a 
two-tiered  system.  Available  to  all  Japanese  residents,  with  70  million 
participants  in  1995,  is  a  national  pension  plan,  which  provides  the  same 
benefits  to  and  requires  the  same  premiums  from  each  insured  person. 
The  second  tier  is  a  government-operated  employee  pension  plan,  in 
which  33  million  people  participated  in  1995,  with  premiums  and  pay- 
ments  depending  on  the  income  of  the  insured.  In  addition  to  the  public 
pension  scheme,  in  199.5  12  million  people  were  covered  by  corporate 
pension  funds  (42  trillion  yen  in  assets),  which  are  generally  managed  by 
life  insurers  and  trust  banks  and  can  substitute  for  the  state-run 
employee  pension  plan.  Another  11  milhon  people  contributed  to  tax* 
qualified  pension  funds  (18  trillion  yen  in  assets  in  1995),  which  are 
managed  in-house  by  companies  and  cannot  substitute  for  the  govem- 
ment’s  employee  pension  plan.  A  person  can  begin  to  receive  pension 
benefits  at  age  60V  but  in  order  to  keep  people  working  for  more  years 
and  to  reduce  the  social  security  outlays  of  the  government,  efforts  are 
being  made  to  change  to  65  the  age’at  which  a  person  can  receive  full 
benefits  (Suzuki  1996;  Ogura  1994,146-148;  Seike  1997b,  153). 
h-r  1995  social  security  costs  accounted  for  13.3  percent  of  national 
income,  an  increase  from  7.5  percent  20  years  earlier.  The  government’s 
Economic  Planning  Agency  projects  that  the  burden  of  social  security 
costs  will  rise  to  around  31  percent  in  2025  and  35  percent  in  2050 
(Nikkei  Weekly  1998,  73).  Ec  onomic  slowdown  and  recession  in  the 
1990s  have  not  helped  the  young  and  strong  support  the  old  and  weak. 
Nor  has  the  fact  that  the  trend  toward  higher  levels  of  female  labor  force 
participation  means  that  women  are  no  longer  as  available  or  willing  to 
care  for  the  sick  and  elderly  as  they  were  in  the  past.  Between  1980  and 
1990,  as  the  number  of  people  aged  65  and  over  increased  by  3.8  million, 
the  proportion  of  the  elderly  living  with  children  or  relatives  declined . 
from  72  percent  to  63  percent  (Takayama  1994,  106).  Proposals  are  now 
being  floated  for  government  funding  of  long-term  nursing  care  for  the 
elderly  (Suzuki  1997b). 
The  highly  regulated  structure  of  interest  rates  and  the  low  yields  on 
Japanese  corporate  equities  make  it  difficult  to  support  the  nation’s  aging 
population  on  the  basis  of  high  returns  on  financial  assets,  as  in  the 
United  States.  At  the  same  time,  the  high  volume  of  savings  per 
Japanese  household  helps  to  offset  these  low  returns  (Nikkei  Weekly 
1997,  141).  During  the  1990s  the  savings  rate  in  Japan  has  remained 
high,  at  about  13  percent  (compared  with  4  or  5  percent  in  the  United 
States),  and  the  average  amount  of  savings  per  household  in  1996  was  13 
million  yen.  Bank  and  postal  savings  deposits  absorb  55  percent  of  these 
savings,  with  life  insurers  holding  20  percent,  private  pensions  5  percent, 
and  money  trusts  4  percent.  Another  12  percent  of  savings  are  in  securi- 
ties  (Nakamura  and  Yamada  1998,149). 
As  a  proportion  of  national  income,  the  value  of  insurance  policies  in 
force  in  Japan  is  almost  two  and  a  half  times  the  U.S.  proportion. 
Japanese  life  insurance  companies,  which  manage  a  large  portion  of  pri- 
vate  pension  funds,  have  a  legal  obligation  to  pay  benefits  out  of  interest 
income  and  have  invested  primarily  in  Japanese  government  bonds. 
During  the  1980s  the  life  insurers,  in  search  of  higher  yields,  invested 
heavily  in  U.S.  Treasury  bills,  but  sustained  huge  losses  in  the  latter  haIf 
of  the  1980s  with  the  60  percent  appreciation  of  the  yen  relative  to  the 
dollar.  In  the  latter  half  of  the  1980s  the  insurance  companies  also 
shifted  their  assets  from  domestic  loans  and  bonds  to  equities  and  then 
sustained  huge  losses  in  the  early  1990s  when  the  stock  market  crashed. 
In  the  199Os,  with  the  cost  of  their  obligations  around  5  percent  but 
with  dividend  yields  on  stock  well  under  1  percent,  the  insurers  have 
stayed  away  from  new  stock  purchases.  They  have  shifted  much  of  their 
assets  into  subordinated  bank  debt  and  loans  to  consumer  credit  compa- 
nies,  but  have  not  been  able  to  come  close  to  the  5  percent  rate  of  return 
they  require.  In  early  1996  the  life  insurers  reduced  their  guaranteed 
returns  to  pension  funds  from  4.5  percent  to  2.5  percent,  leading  some 
major  pension  funds  to  turn  from  life  insurance  companies  to  trust  banks 
and  investment  advisory  companies  to  manage  their  portfolios.  The 
bankruptcy  in  1997  of  Nissan  Mutual  Life  Insurance  Company,  the 
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the  insurance  companies  (Yamamoto  1997;  Tett  1997). 
Corporate  pension  plans  are  under  heavy  pressure  as  well.  A  study  done 
for  71  major  companies,  including  Nippon  Stee\,  Hitachi,  and  Toyota, 
calculated  a  35  percent  underfunding  of  pension  assets  in  20  years  with  a 
return  on  investment  of  3.5  percent  (the  current  average)  and  with 
4,200  enrollees  paying  pensions  to  1,000  retirees  at  current  rates 
(Nakamura  and  Yamada  1998,  145-162).  The  low  returns  on  Japanese 
savings  are  creating  pressure  to  deregulate  interest  rates  and  unravel 
cross+hareholding  for  the  sake  of  higher  returns. 
As  for  rhe  public  pension  system,  the  government  has  made  proposaIs  to 
cut  pension  benefits  or  raise  premiums  or  both  (Yashiro  1997).  An  alter- 
native  is  to  keep  people  working  for  more  years  of  their  lives  and  to 
make  working  people  more  productive.  The  Japanese  pension  problem 
would  be  further  exacerbated  if,  as  in  the  United  States  and  Gerrzany, 
corporations  and  their  employees  opt  for  early  retirement  plans.  Given  a 
surplus  of  workers  in  their  fifries  in  many  Japanese  companies,  the  reces- 
sionary  conditions  of  the  1990s  have  made  it  particularly  tempting  for 
top  management  to  offer  early  retirement  packages  to  lifetime  employees 
rather  than  keep  them  employed  until  the  mandatory  retirement  age 
(currently  60  in  most  companies).  Some  companies  have  implemented 
such  programs,  but  companies  that  are  too  aggressive  about  encouraging 
early  retirement  risk  losing  hard-to-replace  human  resources  (Kodama 
1997).  Still  more  common  among  major  Japanese  companies  is  a  strategy 
of  reallocating  older  employees  to  subsidiaries  so  that  they  can  remain 
employed  and  productive. 
Responses  to  the  Pressures  to  Change 
Reallocation  of  Labor  Resources 
The  long-term  financial  problem  facing  the  Japanese  is  the  increase  in 
intergenerational  dependence.  The  question  is  whether  in  the  late  1990s 
their  solutions  to  this  problem  are  consistent  with  solutions  to  the  more 
immediate  problem  of  restructuring  the  banking  system.  The  current 
strategy  for  resolving  the  problem  of  intergenerational  dependence 
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as  much  as  possible,  they  can  sustain  their  standards  of  living  through 
productive  employment. 
If  the  Japanese  were  to  follow  the  U.S.  model  for  dealing  with  the  prob- 
lem  of  intergenerational  dependence,  they  would  disband  the  system  of 
cross+hareholding  and  deregulate  domestic  interest  rates  to  generate  a 
cash  flow  out  of  corporations  that  would  support  higher  returns  to  sav- 
ings.  Unlike  the  American  institutional  environment,  which  mvors  mars 
ket  control  over  the  allocation  of  corporate  resources  and  returns,  the 
Japanese  institutiona  environment  favors  organizational  control.  The 
U.S.  model  entails  a  corporate  governance  strategy  of  downsizing  corpo- 
rate  labor  forces  and  distributing  corporate  revenues,  whereas  the  strategy 
in  the  Japanese  model  is  to  retain  revenues  and  reallocate  labor  forces. 
Japanese  workers  already  remain  in  the  labor  force  much  longer  than  in 
any  other  advanced  nation.  Although  high  by  international  standards, 
the  current  labor  force  participation  rate  of  Japanese  men  aged  60  to  64 
is  actually  a  sharp  decrease  from  the  rate  of  84  percent  that  prevailed  in 
the  1960s.  It  appears  that,  as  in  other  countries,  Japanese  workers  have 
responded  to  increases  in  pension  benefits  by  retiring  earlier.  The  rate 
declined  to  71  percent  in  the  late  198Os,  primarily  because  of  an  increase 
in  real  pension  benefits-in  1973  the  government  began  indexing  public 
pension  benefits  to  inflation-  but  also  because  of  a  decline  in  the  pro- 
portion  in  the  population  of  self-employed,  who  have  a  higher  labor 
force  participation  rate  for  older  workers  (Seike  1997b,  155-157;  Seike 
and  Shimada  1994).  In  part  because  of  the  recession  of  the  1990s  and  in 
part  because  of  a  government  policy  to  reduce  pension  benefits,  from 
1988  to  1993  the  labor  force  participation  rate  of  men  aged  60  to  64 
years  old  reversed  direction,  increasing  from  71  percent  to  75  percent  in 
1993,  compared  with  55  percent  in  the  United  States  and  35  percent  in 
Germany  (Seike  1997b,  155).  Th.  IS  was  so  despite  the  fact  that  employed 
workers  in  Japan  are  eligible  for  pensions  at  60. 
In  view  of  the  rapid  aging  of  the  population,  the  Ministry  of  Welfare  had 
proposed  in  1984  reducing  future  pension  benefits  and  raising  the  mini* 
mum  age  of  eligibility  from  60  to  65.  Benefits  were  reduced  but,  in  the 
absence  of  pohcies  that  would  ensure  that  those  between  the  ages  of  60 
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and  65  would  be  able  to  find  employment,  political  opposition  prevented 
raising  the  age  of  eligibility.  The  Ministry  of  Labor,  therefore,  proposed  co 
the  tripartite  Employment  Policy  Council  that  employers  should  be 
required  to  keep  employees  on  their  payrolls  until  the  age  of  65-a  policy 
that  employers  vigorously  opposed  (Seike  and  Shimada  1994,43-44). 
In  1994  the  Japanese  government  reformed  the  public  pension  system  by 
moderating  benefit  levels  and  gradually  extending  the  age  at  which  peo- 
ple  would  be  eligible  to  draw  the  full  pension  annuity  from  60  to  65, 
effective  in  2013.  The  reform  also  introduced  a  partial  pension  for  peo- 
ple  aged  60  to  64  that  provides  about  half  of  the  full  pension  for  those 
who  would  like  to  retire  before  65.  For  those  eligible  for  pensions  who 
still  remain  employed,  the  reform  increased  the  amount  of  permitted 
earnings  to  ensure  that  total  income  (earnings  plus  pension  benefit) 
would  not  decrease  as  earnings  rise  (Seike  1996,  4;  Seike  1997b, 
160-161).  Public  pension  policy  is  therefore  working  to  keep  people 
employed  longer. 
In  rhe  late  1990s  the  age  structure  of  corporate  employment  combined 
with  the  continuing  recession  place  a  strain  on  most  companies  that 
would  seek  to  keep  people  employed  even  longer  than  is  presently  the 
case.  The  postwar  baby  boomers  are  now  creating  a  bulge  of  middle-aged 
employees  in  Japanese  companies.  But  the  demographics  are  changing. 
The  size  of  the  population  in  their  twenties,  which  peaked  at  19.2  mil- 
lion  in  1996,  is  predicted  to  drop  to  12.5  million  in  2015;  the  number  of 
people  in  their  sixties  will  increase  by  about  4  million  (Seike  1996,  5). 
Between  2000  and  2010  the  proportion  of  the  labor  force  aged  15  to  29 
is  expected  to  decline  from  23  percent  to  18  percent,  and  the  proportion 
over  55  is  expected  to  increase  from  23  percent  to  27  percent  (Sugeno 
and  Suwa  1997,56).  Other  things  equal,  employers  will  find  it  necessary 
to  employ  an  aging  labor  force  over  the  next  two  decades. 
To  remain  competitive,  Japanese  companies  that  employ  an  aging  labor 
force  have  to  concern  themselves  with  the  productive  contributions  of 
older  workers,  relative  to  both  their  pay  and  the  productive  contribu- 
tions  that  could  be  made  by  younger  workers.  High  levels  of  education 
and  training  and  the  good  health  of  the  labor  force  combine  with  the 
prevalence  of  in-house  organizational  learning  to  enhance  the  produc- 
tivity  of  employees  over  the  course  of  their  careers  (Lazonick  1997). 
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Nevertheless,  the  intense  demands  of  organizational  learning,  particu- 
larly  in  the  presence  of  rapid  technological  change,  place  hmits  on  the 
motivation  and  ability  of  older  workers,  with  given  education  and  expe- 
rience,  to  attain  higher  levels  of  productivity.  To  enable  companies  to 
fulfill  the  commitment  of  keeping  workers  employed,  the  employment 
system  must  be  flexible  enough  to  permit  the  reallocation  of  labor  I 
resources  and  returns  to  labor  in  response  to  changes  in  the  productive 
and  competitive  environments. 
Japanese  companies  already  had  such  a  flexible  employment  system 
coming  into  the  199Os,  and  during  the  1990s  that  flexibility  has  been 
increasing  (Kameyama  1993;  Takanashi  1998).  One  source  of  flexibil- 
ity  is  the  ability  to  reduce  the  number  of  new  hires.  The  employment 
system  is  noted  for  the  practice,  especially  among  the  major  compa- 
nies,  of  recruiting  new  employees  directly  from  the  educational  system 
(high  school  in  the  case  of  blue-collar  workers,  university  in  the  case  of 
white-collar  workers).  In  the  past,  when  a  company  was  growing 
rapidly  and  had  not  yet  accumulated  a  large  supply  of  experienced 
workers  whom  it  had  to  support,  it  could  hire  large  numbers  of  new 
graduates  and  then,  after  a  decade  or  so,  decide  which  of  the  cohort 
were  best  suited  for  employment  tracks  that  provided  more  responsibil- 
ity,  authority,  and  pay. 
What  is  new  in  the  1990s  is  that  employers  have  to  be  more  selective 
about  new  hires.  There  is  a  heightened  competition  for  graduates,  particu- 
larly  university  graduates,  with  specific  capabilities.  Companies  used  to  fol- 
low  the  practice  of  hiring  new  employees  at  the  same  time  every  year  to 
begin  work  on  April  1.  This  practice  (which,  to  be  sure,  some  companies 
violated)  was  meant  to  reduce  competition  among  companies  for  employ- 
ees  and  ensure  that  new  employees  would  enter  a  company  and  continue 
their  careers  in  it  as  a  cohort.  Now  it  is  becoming  acceptable  for  cornpa- 
nies  to  hire  out  of  season.  In  a  1996  survey  by  Keidanren  (Japanese 
Federation  of  Economic  Organizations)  of  501  Japanese  companies,  13 
percent  said  they  hire  at  various  times  during  the  year  and  another  32  per- 
cent  said  they  had  such  a  hiring  practice  under  consideration. 
In  addition,  Japanese  companies  have  traditionally  filled  ail  openings  for 
lifetime  employment  positions  with  young  people  (until  the  late  1980s 
invariably  men),  who  were  newly  graduated  from  high  school  or 
The  Jerome  Levy Economics  hstimtc  of  Bard Cokge  3s university.  These  employees  would  then  be  trained  internally  to  develop 
specialized  skills.  Now,  however,  many  companies  are  hiring  people  who 
already  have  specialized  skills,  either  through  work  experience  or  univer- 
sity  tmining.  The  Keidanren  survey  found  that  27  percent  of  respondents 
were  recruiting  people  for  specific  jobs,  another  12  percent  were  recruit- 
ing  only  for  specific  research  jobs,  and  22  percent  had  such  recruiting 
practices  under  consideration.  This  kind  of  change  in  hiring  practices 
means  that  an  increasing  proportion  of  young  workers  are  engaging  in 
job-hopping,  although  the  ultimate  objective  of  their  labor  mobility  is 
still  to  find  the  particular  company  that  can  offer  an  attractive  lifetime 
career  (Nina  1995). 
A  second  source  of  flexibility  is  in  rewards.  Traditionally,  liietime  employ- 
ees  were  recruited  to  companies  from  high  school  or  college  and  then  saw 
their  earnings  increase  primarily  on  the  basis  of  seniority  (with  supplement 
for  larger  numbers  of  dependents).  The  main  competition  among  employ- 
ees  was  over  the  pace  and  type  of  promotion,  although  even  then  seniority 
bulked  large  as  a  criterion  for  promotion  over  the  first  two  decades  of  com- 
pany  service.  h-r  the  1990s  individual  performance  has  begun  to  count 
much  more  in  det  ermining  promotion  and  pay.  A  1995  survey  of  210  com- 
panies  based  in  Tokyo  found  that  24  percent  had  innoduced  merit  pay  sys- 
term  and  another  28  percent  planned  to  do  so  in  the  next  three  years. 
Third,  and  perhaps  most  important,  as  a  source  of  flexibility  is  the  major 
companies’  right,  in  consultation  with  their  enterprise  unions,  to  transfer 
employees  entering  their  late  forties  or  early  fifties  to  subsidiary  enter- 
prises,  where  pay  and  responsibilities  are  generally  substantially  lower 
(Japanese  Institute  of  Labor  1997,30-31).  Provided  the  subsidiaries  can 
absorb  these  employees,  the  benefit  for  them  is  that  they  get  experienced 
personnel  without  having  to  invest  in  training.  In  some  enterprises  the 
core  company  assigns  employees  to  the  subsidiaries,  and  in  others  the 
subsidiaries  recruit  employees  from  the  core  company.  At  the  same  time, 
that  small  proportion  of  managerial  employees  who  are  considered  to  be 
especially  valuable  to  the  company  are  given  the  opportunity,  even  after 
the  official  retirement  age,  to  continue  to  work  for  the  company  in  posi- 
tions  of  executive  responsibility  and  at  relatively  high  pay. 
One  type  of  labor  reallocation  is  sM&o,  the  temporary  placement  of  a 
core  company  employee  with  a  subsidiary,  with  the  core  company  often 
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supplementing  the  pay  of  the  transferred  worker.  In  theory  the  worker 
could  be  transferred  back  to  the  core  company,  but  in  practice  the  trans- 
fer  often  becomes  permanent,  with  the  subsidiary  taking  over  responsi- 
bility  for  the  employee.  A  second  type  of  labor  reallocation  is  tensek4  the 
permanent  transfer  of  an  employee  to  another  company.  Most  s/u&o 
and  tenseki  transfers  are  horn  larger  to  smaller  companies.  Of  all  compa- 
nies  with  1,000  or  more  employees,  about  87  percent  engage  in  sIu&.k~ 
and  tznseh;  the  employees  transferred  are  likely  to  be  in  their  fifties;  and 
many,  if  not  most,  employees  who  are  loaned  to  a  subsidiary  find  that 
their  new  employment  becomes  permanent,  that  is,  their  status  changes 
from  s!u&ko  to  tinseLi  (Sat0  19965). 
Traditionally,  both  sI&ko  and  tenselti  transfers  were  from  a  core  com- 
pany  to  a  relared  company  within  the  enterprise  soup.  But  increasingly 
in  the  199Os,  as  subsidiaries  have  found  it  difficult  to  absorb  the  number 
of  experienced  personnel  that  the  core  companies  want  to  reallocate, 
the  core  companies  have  been  finding  unrelated  enterprises  to  which 
they  can  make  tens.&  transfers.  The  core  company  maintains  its  corn- 
mitment  to  lifetime  employment,  but  the  company  at  which  an 
employee  ends  his  career  may  change  and  the  late-career  pay  of  the 
transferred  worker  is  likely  to  be  lower  and  his  working  conditions  less 
attractive  (Sato  1996,  1997a,  1997b). 
This  reallocation  of  labor  resources  is  part  of  the  Japanese  phenomenon 
of  enterprise  “spin-off.”  Spin-off  is  a  product  of  a  system  of  corporate 
governance  that  permits  a  successful  company  to  allocate  both  money 
and  people  to  the  creation  of  new  business  enteTrises,  which  then  have 
considerable  autonomy  in  the  allocation  of  their  own  resources  and 
returns.  During  the  1970s  and  1980s  spin-off  was  used  increasingly  as  an 
organizational  strategy  (Odagiri  1994,  145-146).  During  the  1990s  it  hs 
become  a  particularly  effective  means  for  a  company  to  reallocate  labor 
resource  in  ways  that  create  opportunities  for  its  employees  and  poten- 
tial  sources  of  new  employment  in  the  economy  more  generally. 
Spin-off  enterprises  can  be  suppliers  or  distributors  in  a  vertical  k&ersu 
or  manufacturers  of  a  new  line  of  products  as  part  of  a  horizontal  keirew 
or  kigyo  sIu.uIan.  Spin-off  cuts  down  on  layers  of  management  and  decen- 
tralizes  authority  and  responsibility  far  more  effectively  than  the  much- 
vaunted  multidivisional  enterprise,  in  which  responsibility  may  be 
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In  horizontal  keiretsti,  by  creating  new  units  of  strategic  decision  making 
that  are  focused  on  particular  products,  spin-off  facilitates  the  integra- 
tion  of  enterprise  strategy  and  organizational  learning.  Spin-off  increases 
the  number  of  managerial  positions  that  entail  authority  and  responsibil- 
ity  without  increasing  the  layers  of  management  and  hence  is  of  great 
importance  to  the  functioning  of  &kko. 
Although  not  all  spin-off  entails  the  development  of  new  technology,  it 
often  functions  as  a  Japanese  form  of  venture  capital  (Nitta  1997).  In 
1997  the  Committee  on  Economic  Policy  of  Keidanren  proposed  spin-off 
ventures  as  one  way  of  meeting  the  challenges  to  the  Japanese  employ 
ment  system.  In  making  this  proposal,  Keidanren  is  promoting,  on  a 
national  scale,  a  business  strategy  that  has  long  been  practiced  by  the 
major  industrial  enterprises,  The  leader  in  this  campaign  is  Toyota 
Motor  Corporation,  whose  president,  Shoichiro  Toyoda,  was  the  chair- 
man  of  Keidanren.  In  1996  Toyota  set  up  a  SO  billion  yen  venture- 
capital  fund  to  provide  financial  assistance  to  new  enterprises  within  its 
group.  In  1997  it  expanded  the  program  to  include  ventures  outside  the 
Toyota  group,  generally  taking  equity  stakes  of  50  percent  or  more  in 
each  company.  In  so  doing,  Toyota  became  the  largest  single  source  of 
venture  capital  in  Japan;  the  next  largest  fund  has  20  billion  yen.  As  of 
June  1997  the  Toyota  fund  had  financed  8  ventures  and,  with  applica- 
tions  from  about  300  companies,  planned  to  invest  in  about  10  compa- 
nies  per  year  in  industries  such  as  semiconductors,  information  and 
communications,  biotechnology,  environmental  technologies,  and  ser- 
vices  for  senior  citizens  (“Toyota  Expands  Venture  Fund”  1997;  Odagiri 
1998). 
Such  efforts  by  Japanese  corporations  to  allocate  resources  to  new 
sources  of  domestic  employment  have  become  all  the  more  important  as, 
in  the  face  of  high  costs  in  Japan  exacerbated  by  the  strength  of  the  yen, 
they  have  sought  to  rationalize  their  global  operations  and  have  shifted 
many  of  their  operations  to  lower  cost  locations  in  Asia  (Yahata  1996,s; 
Hatch  and  Yamamura  1996,  7).  In  1989  about  43  percent  of  foreign 
direct  investment  by  Japanese  enterprises  went  to  Asia;  by  1994  it  had 
risen  to  about  83  percent,  with  more  than  60  percent  going  to  China 
(Japan  Statistics  Bureau  1998,  213).  Most  of  this  foreign  direct  invest- 
ment  is  in  manufacturing. 
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penetration  have  raised  some  fears  of  a  “hollowing  out”  of  employment 
in  Japan;but  within  Japan  the  consensus  seems  to  be  that  such  fears  are 
overdrawn.  Much  depends  on  the  incentive  and  ability  of  companies  to 
make  investments  in  higher  value-added  products  and  processes  that 
require  complex  organizational  learning.  A  1994  survey  by  the  Export- 
Import  Bank  of  Japan  found  that  well  over  90  percent  of  Japanese  com- 
panies  that  had  transferred  production  facilities  overseas  either  had 
retained  their  key  technologies  or  were  developing  more  advanced  tech- 
nologies  in  Japan  (Okina  and  Kohsaka  1996,  72).  Many  opportunities 
exist  for  developing  the.se  technologies  in  small  technologically  oriented 
companies  that  are  networked  horizontally  and  vertically  with  other 
innovative  enterprises  in  their  industries  (Okiia  and  Kohsaka  1996,76). 
Financial  “Big  Bang” 
There  is  abundant  evidence  that  Japan  is  well-positioned  in  terms  of  its 
accumulation  of  technological  capabilities  and  investments  in  new  tech- 
nologies  to  regenerate  its  industrial  production.  In  manufacturing  it 
retains  distinct  competitive  advantages  in  the  integration  of  precision 
engineering,  advanced  materials,  and  electronics.  Prime  sectors  for 
industrial  innovation  are  in  the  provision  of  telecommunications  ser- 
vices,  transportation  services,  and  energy-inputs  to  industry  and  key 
components  of  living  standards  that  remain  high  in  cost  in  comparison 
with  other  advanced  economies  (Okina  and  Kohsaka  1996,65). 
In  order  to  take  advantage  of  the  new  technological  opportunities,  a 
larger  proportion  of  the  Japanese  labor  force  will  need  higher  levels  of 
education  and  specialized  training.  From  1990  to  1996  the  number  of 
males  enrolled  in  Japanese  universities  increased  by  12  percent  and  the 
number  of  females  by  48  percent  (Japan  Statistics  Bureau  1998, 
702-703).  The  changing  hiring  patterns  of  Japanese  companies  along 
with  the  increasing  use  of  incentive  pay  reflect  the  needs  of  these  com- 
panies  to  attract  and  retain  more  highly  specialized  personnel  than  was 
the  case  in  the  past. 
The  retain-and-reallocate  strategy  emphasizes  incomes  from  productive 
employment  rather  than  incomes  from  financial  assets  to  support  the 
employees  over  the  course  of  their  lives.  Given  low  and  regulated 
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Table  4  Deregulation  ‘Iimetable  for  Japan’s  Financial  “Big  Bang” 
Fiscal  1997 
.  Securities  houses  allowed  to  handle  consumer  payments  for  their  clients 
Fiscal  1998 
l  Companies  and  individuals  allowed  to  handle  foreign  exchange  transactions 
without  government  authorization 
.  Banks  allowed  to  sell  their  own  investment  trust  over  the  counter 
l  Ban  on  financial  holding  companies  lifted 
l  Firms  allowed  to  become  securities  brokerages  without  government  licenses 
l  Securities  houses  allowed  to  expand  asset  management  services 
Fiicall999 
l  Securities  houses  free  to  set  their  commissions  on  securities  trading  of  any  size 
l  Market-value  method  applied  to  marketabIe  securities 
l  Barriers  that  restricted  banks,  trust  banks,  and  securities  houses  from  entering 
each  other’s  markets  removed 
l  Banks  allowed  to  issue  straight  bonds 
By  the  end  of  2001 
l  Banks  and  securities  houses  allowed  to  enter  insurance  sector 
Schedule  not  set 
l  Enactment  of  a  new  financial  services  law  to  govern  banking,  securities,  and 
insurance  sectors 
Sources Masato  Ishizawa, “I Big Eang’ Program  Taking  Clearer  Shape,” Mkkci  WeeMy,  June 
16,  1997. 
interest  rates  and  the  low  yields  on  corporate  stock  that  prevail  in  Japan, 
any  higher  rates  to  Japanese  pensions  will  have  to  come  from  invest- 
ments  on  international  capital  markets.  Such  investments,  even  in  safe 
foreign  securities,  are  fraught  with  exchange  rate  risks,  as  the  Japanese 
hfe  insurers  found  out  in  the  late  1980s.  A  prime  motivation  of  the 
financial  “big  bang”  pohcy  announced  by  Prime  Minister  Hashimoto 
after  his  reelection  in  November  1996  was  to  put  the  Japanese  financial 
sector  in  a  better  position  to  manage  such  risks  as  they  pursue  higher 
yields  on  the  savings  under  their  control  (“City  Banks  Are  Jumping  into 
Pension-Fund  Consulting  Services”  1996). 
Central  to  the  attempt  to  deal  with  the  financial  crisis  is  a  transforma- 
tion  in  the  ways  in  which  financial  enterprise+particularly  the  long- 
term  credit  banks,  trust  banks,  securities  companies,  life  insurance 
companies,  and  some  of  the  weaker  city  and  regional  banks-allocate 
the  financial  resources  under  their  control  and  generate  financial 
returns.  These  fmancial  enterprises  have  found  themselves  on  the  short 
i 
I 
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end  of  speculative  investments,  made  within  a  highly  segmented  finan- 
cial  system,  that  cannot  generate  returns.  The  financial  “big  bang” 
entails  a  deregulation  of  the  historic  segmentation  of  financial  services 
in  Japan  to  create  new  business  opportunities,  both  at  home  and  abroad, 
for  those  banks,  securities  companies,  and  insurers  that  are  best  able  and 
wilhng  to  rise  to  the  challenge.  Such  a  strategy  requires  financial  enter- 
prises  that  have  a  sound  financial  base  at  home  and  can  develop  the 
capabilities  to  operate  simultaneously  and  quickly  on  international  secu- 
rities  markets  and  money  markets.  These  augmented  capabilities  could 
open  up  new  sources  of  profits  for  these  ftnancial  enterprises,  thus 
enabling  them  to  employ  more  people  in  Japan  and  to  bring  in  higher 
returns  on  household  savings. 
But,  despite  the  image  of  radical  change  that  the  reform’s  slogan  is  meant 
to  impart,  the  “big  bang”  does  not  entail  a  deregulation  of  domestic  inter- 
est  rates  nor  a  dismantling  of  cross+hareholding  (see  Table  4).  From  the 
government’s  perspective,  the  success  of  this  strategy  of  fmancial  reorgani- 
zation  will  depend  on  the  ability  of  financial  enterprises  to  learn  how  to 
make  profits  in  the  international  world  of  financial  liquidity,  while  being 
denied  the  opportunity  to  extract  higher  financial  returns  from  productive 
enterprises  at  home.  Such  a  transformation,  if  successful,  could  enable  now 
fragile  financial  enterprises  to  survive  by  tapping  into  high  returns  on 
financial  assets  abroad  to  augment  the  returns  on  savings  at  home.  By  this 
means  the  returns  on  domestic  savings  could  be  increased  without  under- 
mining  financial  commitment  to  productive  entetpri,vs.  In  transforming 
their  capabilities  to  provide  financial  services,  Japanese  financial  enter- 
prises  already  face  formidable  competition  within  Japan  from  foreign  (par- 
ticularly  American)  companies,  the  largest  of  which  have  been  operating 
in  Japan  since  at  least  the  mid  1980s.  Indeed,  a  number  of  Japanese  fman- 
cial  enterprises  have  linked  up  with  foreign  companies  to  reposition  them- 
selves  in  the  new  market  environment9 
Neither  the  deregulation  of  domestic  interest  rates  nor  the  unravehng  of 
cross-shareholding  is  part  of  the  financial  reform  agenda.  Indeed,  despite 
its  failure  to  control  the  bubble  economy  of  the  late  1980s  and  to  con- 
tain  the  accumulation  of  bad  loans  in  the  199Os,  the  power  of  the 
Ministry  of  Finance  and  the  Bank  of  Japan  to  coordinate  and  regulate 
the  Japanese  financial  system  in  favor  of  productive  investment  has 
increased  during  the  1990s.  The  need  to  ensure  financial  conditions  that 
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can  help  transform  nonperforming  loans  into  performing  loans  has  pro- 
vided  a  rationale  for  maintaining  the  structure  of  low  and  regulated 
interest  rates.  As  for  financial  leverage,  the  ministry’s  Ti-ust  Fund  Bureau 
directly  controls  at  least  half  of  financial  transactions  in  Japan.  With  the 
return  on  postal  savings  accounts  still  somewhat  more  favorable  than  the 
return  on  commercial  bank  accounts  and  with  the  banking  system  in 
fragile  condition,  an  increasing  proportion  of  Japanese  household  savings 
have  been  deposited  with  the  post  office.” 
Some,  however,  see  the  current  financial  reforms  in  the  organization  of 
the  banking  sector  as  a  prelude  to  a  dismantling  of  cross-shareholding 
that  will  eventually  give  financial  interests  their  higher  returns.”  Others 
contend  that,  with  the  deregulation  of  the  financial  services  sector, 
Japanese  households  will  gain  access  to  alternative  forms  of  savings  that 
will  lead  to  withdrawals  from  the  postal  savings  system  (Strom  1997, 
D4).  How  far  the  “big  bang”  can  proceed  without  creating  powerful 
financial  interests  that  have  not  only  the  incentive  but  also  the  ability  to 
extract  higher  yields  from  the  Japanese  domestic  economy  remains  to  be 
seen.  What  can  be  said  is  that  the  current  agenda  for  financial  reform 
seeks  to  work  within  the  corporate  governance  tiamework  that  empha- 
sizes  the  retain-and-reallocate  strategy.  Such  a  strategy  is  inconsistent 
with  the  ideology  of  financial  deregulation  and  shareholder  “value 
creation”  that  has  driven  the  downsize-and-distribute  strategy  of  U.S. 
corporations.  It  is  dangerous,  therefore,  to  analyze  the  possible  outcomes 
of  the  transformation  of  the  Japanese  financial  sector  from  an  American 
perspective  on  the  allocation  of  resources  and  returns. 
1.  Corporate  strategies  are  influenced  hy  corporate  governance  institutions  that 
reflect  different  degrees  of  “market  control”  and  “organizational  control.” 
Market  control  encourages  a  corporate  strategy  of  downsize  and  distribute; 
organizational  control  encourages  retain  and  reallocate.  For  the  distinction 
between  these  types  of  control  and  their  application  to  industrial  fiiance  in 
comparative  historical  perspective,  see  Lazonick  and  O’Sullivan  (1997b). 
2.  For  western  perspectives  that  look  only  at  the  role  of  financial  interests  in 
corporate  governance,  see  Kester  (1991),  Gerlach  (1992),  Schaede  (1994). 
and  Sheard  (1998).  For  critiques  of  this  perspective  as  applied  to  the  United 
States,  see  Lazonick  (1992)  and  O’Sullivan  (forthcoming  b).  For  a  perspec- 
tive  on  Japanese  corporate  governance  that  is  broadly  consistent  with  the 
arguments  in  this  paper,  see  Abegglen  and  Stalk  (1985).  See  also  Koji 
(1998). 











/duping to  Finan&!  Pressures  fm CItunge 
The  term  for  government  officials  who  are  finishing  their  careers  at  business 
enterprises  is  am&dun,  or  “descent  from  heaven.” 
For  a  more  general  argument  concerning  the  roles  of  organizations  and  mare 
kets  in  the  allocation  of  resources  in  the  process  of  successful  economic 
development,  see  Lazonick  (1991).  For  the  key  characteristics  of  the  innova- 
tion  process  and  their  implicarions  for  the  applicability  of  modem  financial 
theory  for  understanding  resource  allocation  for  economic  development,  see 
O’Sullivan  (forthcoming  a). 
Bad  loans  are  defined  as  loans  to  bankrupt  borrowers,  loans  for  which  any 
part  of  interest  has  not  been  paid  in  six  monrhs  (except  when  loans  have 
been  restructured),  and,  from  fiscal  year  1995,  loans  for  which  the  interest 
rate  has  been  reduced  below  the  official  discount  rate  that  prevailed  at  the 
time  of  the  reduction. 
For  a  purely  financial  perspective  on  the  “bubble  economy”  by  a  sraff  person 
for  TIte  Economist,  see  Wood  (1992). 
Mark  Farrington,  senior  analyst  at  MMS  International,  quoted  in  Lake 
(1990). 
Another  expanding  market  in  the  1980s  for  Japanese  city  banks,  long-term 
credit  banks,  and  trust  companies  was  overseas  lending;  the  proportion  of 
overseas  loans  in  the  portfolios  of  all  Japanese  banks  rose  from  just  over  3 
percent  in  1975  to  6  percent  in  1980,  8  percent  in  1985,  and  11  percent  in 
1990. 
In  February  1998,  for  example,  cash-rich  GE  Capital  Services  Corp.  took  a 
major  stake  in  Toho  Mutual  Life  Insurance  Co.,  and  Merrill  Lynch  hired 
Z@O  former  employees  of  the  bankrupt  Yamaichi  Securiries  as  part  of  a  plan 
to  develop  a  retail  brokerage  network  in  Japan.  See  Sprague  and  Mutsuko 
(1998),  and  articles  listed  at 
ht~:/~ob.nikkei.co.jp/cncws/SP~ClAL~ig~n~igban~.html. 
As  of  July  1998,  however,  in  a  move  to  strengthen  government  oversight  of 
financial  institutions,  a  new  Financial  Supervision  Agency  under  the  admin- 
istrative  control  of  the  Prime  Minister’s  Office  will  take  over  the  role  of  the 
Ministry  of  Finance  in  supervising  and  inspecting  financial  institutions.  The 
ministry  will  continue  to  plan  firmncial  policy  (Yokota  i997a).  On  proposed 
changes  in  the  ministry’s  control  over  the  Bank  of  Japan,  see  Fujiwara 
(  1997).  On  the  growth  of  postal  savings,  Yokota  (1998). 
See,  for  example,  remarks  by  Akiro  Kant-to,  vice  chairman  and  senior  execu- 
tive  director,  Zenginko  (Federation  of  Bankers  Associations  of  Japan)  in 
Economist  Conferences  (1997,52). 
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